Re: Three steps we could take to make supply chain attacks a bit harder

2024-03-30 Thread Artem S. Tashkinov via devel
This approach > let's delete autoconf-generated cruft from upstream projects and regenerate > it in %prep To me sounds woefully inappropriate for the task at hand. You remove a single attack vector while completely overlooking that many of your maintainers don't have the qualifications to vet

Re: Three steps we could take to make supply chain attacks a bit harder

2024-03-30 Thread Artem S. Tashkinov via devel
I'm not sure my proposal has been understood at all. This website/authority is a sort of advisory board where each member's participation is 100% voluntary and distros are free to **ignore** it altogether. What this website will contain is just a nice list of vetted open source packages, versi

Re: Three steps we could take to make supply chain attacks a bit harder

2024-03-30 Thread Artem S. Tashkinov via devel
Hi, It was sheer luck that the exploit was discovered and major distros haven't yet included it in their stable releases. It's quite possible and plausible it could have reached RHEL, Debian, Ubuntu, SLES and other distros and it's almost reached Fedora 40. I don't know how to talk to RedHat/I