I am not a kernel developer, but I do think it would be a step forward
simply to erase a [substantial|critical] part of the physical memory
before the system enters stages S4 or S5. An option in ACPI driver,
implemented somewhere in acpi_os_stall() ?, I really don't know.
Vaclav M.
--
devel
On 11/11/2010 07:55 PM, Roman Rakus wrote:
On 11/08/2010 03:12 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
Here is the attack: Your system is running with nice secure encrypted
drives, no console access (or a locked screen on a laptop). The
attacker inserts a bootable USB key and hits the power
On 11/08/2010 10:18 AM, Petr Pisar wrote:
So, after quick reading, this is not what I expected. This is just
another kernel block cypher used by dmcrypt to (de)crypt block device
data guartneeing encryption key does no leave CPU by storing the key in
SSE register. The drawback is nobody can
Hi all,
I have read some articles about the Cold Boot Attacks and I am
wondering whether my Fedora box is protected against such kinds of
attack, at least to some extent.
I work like an Embedded SW/HW Developer and my experience is that data
could remain in the dynamic memory for quite long
On 10/26/2010 03:57 PM, nodata wrote:
On 26/10/10 16:11, Andrew Haley wrote:
On 10/26/2010 02:44 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
On Tue, Oct 26, 2010 at 12:28:55AM +0200, nodata wrote:
What I am concerned about is that the volume is mounted for _every_ user
on the system to
