Hi Richard,
On Sat, 2018-01-06 at 11:27 +, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> I noticed as a side effect of compiling GCC for riscv64 that RISC-V's
> GCC doesn't support -fstack-clash-protection. Do you know what is
> involved to add it? From a naive point of view I don't understand
> why this
On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 01:10:21PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> On 01/05/2018 12:41 PM, Mark Wielaard wrote:
> >On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:36:27PM -0800, John Reiser wrote:
> >>2) The explicit write by the stack probe can mask a memcheck(valgrind)
> >>violation, at least until memcheck groks
On 01/05/2018 06:36 AM, John Reiser wrote:
1) Each on-stack allocation (both fixed- and variable-sized [alloca()])
always is present and "dirty". The stack probe (or the incremental growth
of <= PAGE_SIZE bytes at a time) forces it to consume separate, real RAM.
In a local declaration such as
On 01/05/2018 01:26 PM, Stephan Bergmann wrote:
On 01/05/2018 12:41 PM, Mark Wielaard wrote:
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:36:27PM -0800, John Reiser wrote:
2) The explicit write by the stack probe can mask a memcheck(valgrind)
violation, at least until memcheck groks the probe.
That should
On 01/05/2018 12:41 PM, Mark Wielaard wrote:
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:36:27PM -0800, John Reiser wrote:
2) The explicit write by the stack probe can mask a memcheck(valgrind)
violation, at least until memcheck groks the probe.
That should not be true. The probe is done after the stack
On 01/05/2018 10:17 AM, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:36:27PM -0800, John Reiser wrote:
4) All code must be generated by a compiler that enforces the probing policy,
and all language support run-time routines also must enforce the policy.
No mixing of old or
On 01/05/2018 12:41 PM, Mark Wielaard wrote:
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:36:27PM -0800, John Reiser wrote:
2) The explicit write by the stack probe can mask a memcheck(valgrind)
violation, at least until memcheck groks the probe.
That should not be true. The probe is done after the stack
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:36:27PM -0800, John Reiser wrote:
> 2) The explicit write by the stack probe can mask a memcheck(valgrind)
>violation, at least until memcheck groks the probe.
That should not be true. The probe is done after the stack pointer is
lowered, so memcheck/valgrind knows
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:36:27PM -0800, John Reiser wrote:
> 4) All code must be generated by a compiler that enforces the probing policy,
> and all language support run-time routines also must enforce the policy.
> No mixing of old or foreign compilers with the new gcc.
> No mixing of old or
== Detailed Description ==
* Compile all binaries with stack clash protection
(-fstack-clash-protection). As a result, all stack overflows (i.e.,
situations where the allocated stack is completely exhausted) will
reliably result in crashes.
Further investigation reveals that the intent is to
== Detailed Description ==
* Compile all binaries with stack clash protection
(-fstack-clash-protection). As a result, all stack overflows (i.e.,
situations where the allocated stack is completely exhausted) will
reliably result in crashes.
Rawhide-Live gcc-7.2.1-5.fc28.x86_64 recognizes
On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 14:28 +0100, Jan Kurik wrote:
> = System Wide Change: Hardening Flags Updates for Fedora 28 =
> https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/HardeningFlags28
>
> Change owner(s):
> * Florian Weimer
>
>
> This system-wide change covers changes to the hardening flags in
> Fedora
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 10:37:03AM -0800, John Reiser wrote:
> I'd comment on the wiki page, but cannot login because I have only FAS "cla"
> access.
> I tried to get "cla+1" by joining a group, but the only groups
> with Join buttons were Marketing-related, and I'm not interested there.
Posting
On 01/04/2018 05:28 AM, Jan Kurik wrote:
= System Wide Change: Hardening Flags Updates for Fedora 28 =
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/HardeningFlags28
This change might be on a fast track to failure.
== Detailed Description ==
* Compile all binaries with stack clash protection
= System Wide Change: Hardening Flags Updates for Fedora 28 =
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/HardeningFlags28
Change owner(s):
* Florian Weimer
This system-wide change covers changes to the hardening flags in Fedora 28.
== Detailed Description ==
* Compile all binaries with stack
= System Wide Change: Hardening Flags Updates for Fedora 28 =
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/HardeningFlags28
Change owner(s):
* Florian Weimer
This system-wide change covers changes to the hardening flags in Fedora 28.
== Detailed Description ==
* Compile all binaries with stack
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