> olpc-update is presently only runnable on machines which have already
> passed the boot-lock; therefore its operation does not require any
> additional signatures.
Thank you. Now it makes sense to me -- a wrongdoer can insert a
device and try booting it (e.g., the four-game-button press) -- so
On Fri, Aug 01, 2008 at 12:49:31AM -0400, Mikus Grinbergs wrote:
>>> I have a general question. I'm going to be helping some Ship.2 G1G1
>>> users (without developer keys) to perform off-line-upgrades of their
>>> systems. Currently I have to "data mine" through the wiki to verify
>>> which build
>> I have a general question. I'm going to be helping some Ship.2 G1G1
>> users (without developer keys) to perform off-line-upgrades of their
>> systems. Currently I have to "data mine" through the wiki to verify
>> which builds are "signed" (and can be "applied" from an USB stick).
>
> Things
On Thu, Jul 31, 2008 at 09:01:24AM -0400, Mikus Grinbergs wrote:
> You wrote, regarding "nominated" 8.2 builds:
>> In a few weeks, once we're more confident in the
>> sustainability and security of the build, then we'll publish an official
>> candidate build with cryptographic signatures that mark
