Re: [OpenZFS Developer] [openzfs] Possible access beyond end of string in zpool comment (#47)

2015-12-18 Thread Prakash Surya
@zettabot go --- Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/openzfs/openzfs/pull/47#issuecomment-165751107___ developer mailing list developer@open-zfs.org http://lists.open-zfs.org/mailman/listinfo/developer

Re: [OpenZFS Developer] [openzfs] Possible access beyond end of string in zpool comment (#47)

2015-12-18 Thread George Wilson
LGTM --- Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/openzfs/openzfs/pull/47#issuecomment-165781640___ developer mailing list developer@open-zfs.org http://lists.open-zfs.org/mailman/listinfo/developer

Re: [OpenZFS Developer] [openzfs] Possible access beyond end of string in zpool comment (#47)

2015-12-18 Thread Dan McDonald
I'm SO sorry for introducing that. Dumb question --> is there an easy-to-use kernel isprint() yet? :) Ship it! (Or, if you've enough reviewers, I'll try and make sure to approve this RTI in illumos-gate.) --- Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:

Re: [OpenZFS Developer] [openzfs] Possible access beyond end of string in zpool comment (#47)

2015-12-18 Thread ilovezfs
@ahrens @grwilson @danmcd It's worth noting that there's a corresponding userland check that would need to be modified as well in order to support unicode: https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate/blob/9a686fbc186e8e2a64e9a5094d44c7d6fa0ea167/usr/src/lib/libzfs/common/libzfs_pool.c#L582-L593 ---

Re: [OpenZFS Developer] [openzfs] Possible access beyond end of string in zpool comment (#47)

2015-12-18 Thread Matthew Ahrens
There is no checking that I know of, any nul-terminated byte array works On Friday, December 18, 2015, Dan McDonald wrote: > If the user properties can withstand fuzzing (imagine a delegated dataset > non-root user being able to fuzz), then steal it. Is there such

Re: [OpenZFS Developer] [openzfs] Possible access beyond end of string in zpool comment (#47)

2015-12-18 Thread Dan McDonald
If the user properties can withstand fuzzing (imagine a delegated dataset non-root user being able to fuzz), then steal it. Is there such checking in the user properties? --- Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:

Re: [OpenZFS Developer] [openzfs] Possible access beyond end of string in zpool comment (#47)

2015-12-17 Thread zettabot
Can one of the admins verify this patch? --- Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/openzfs/openzfs/pull/47#issuecomment-165704885___ developer mailing list developer@open-zfs.org

[OpenZFS Developer] [openzfs] Possible access beyond end of string in zpool comment (#47)

2015-12-17 Thread Jorgen Lundman
The 'check' pointer is incremented in both the for-loop's update statement, as well as, in the body of the loop. This means only every second character is actually checked for low-ascii, and potentially, bytes beyond the string's null-terminator can be attempted to be accessed. You can view,