On Fri, 08 Jun 2007 08:25:37 -0400, Colin Davis wrote:
> Jusa- I don't think this line of argument is productive. ;) They've had
> this argument 10,000 times, and I don't think Matthew's position is going
> to change.
>
> He fundamentally believes that ANY opennet system could be easily blocked
>
On Friday 08 June 2007 21:06, Jusa Saari wrote:
> > Your point is that without a critical mass, Freenet is of limited
> > usefulness- It's hard to FIND friends who use Freenet, which makes a
> > global darknet difficult. This is also true.
>
> Of course, in order for you to have at least three frie
Important detail:
On a DNF, we accept the DNF's list of best-so-far-not-visited locations, but
we limit the number of forks to say 2. Thus we limit the possible damage
caused by a node deliberately returning locations far away from the target.
On Thursday 07 June 2007 09:44, vive wrote:
> On Wed
On Friday 08 June 2007 14:31, Luke771 wrote:
> On bittorrent, I usually torify tracker connection but not p2p connections.
> That leaves me still vulnerable to my peers but makes it somewhat less
> easy to label my IP as 'evil file sharer' because monitoring the tracker
> won't show my real IP bu
On bittorrent, I usually torify tracker connection but not p2p connections.
That leaves me still vulnerable to my peers but makes it somewhat less
easy to label my IP as 'evil file sharer' because monitoring the tracker
won't show my real IP but a tor server.
By the way, am I the only one thin
On Fri, 08 Jun 2007 00:06:42 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> Nonetheless the general thrust of Jusa's argument was that there is no
> point having darknet. He's wrong. Opennet is a means to an end, not the be
> all and end all.
More to the point, I'm trying to argue that having a global darknet
On Fri, 08 Jun 2007 00:05:41 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> On Thursday 07 June 2007 21:23, Jusa Saari wrote:
>> On Wed, 06 Jun 2007 19:11:27 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
>> > Recent probe data suggests a theory:
>> >
>> > Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e.
>> > sub-ne
* Colin Davis [2007-06-08 08:25:37]:
[snip.]
> I look at it, and know that opennet is necessary for the darknet to
> prosper.. Once Opennet is in place, people have a larger incentive to
> run Freenet. This means that they add permanent nodes, which is good.
Opennet will add churn to the equa
On Friday 08 June 2007 21:06, Jusa Saari wrote:
> > Your point is that without a critical mass, Freenet is of limited
> > usefulness- It's hard to FIND friends who use Freenet, which makes a
> > global darknet difficult. This is also true.
>
> Of course, in order for you to have at least three frie
On Fri, 08 Jun 2007 08:25:37 -0400, Colin Davis wrote:
> Jusa- I don't think this line of argument is productive. ;) They've had
> this argument 10,000 times, and I don't think Matthew's position is going
> to change.
>
> He fundamentally believes that ANY opennet system could be easily blocked
>
Important detail:
On a DNF, we accept the DNF's list of best-so-far-not-visited locations, but
we limit the number of forks to say 2. Thus we limit the possible damage
caused by a node deliberately returning locations far away from the target.
On Thursday 07 June 2007 09:44, vive wrote:
> On Wed
We disagree on user behavior and motivation, and I accept that ;)
That said, we agree on what should be done, and that's what matters ;)
I just think that it might be time for you and Toad to decide to just
stop responding to Opennet-related posts. It seems like the same
arguments occur ad nause
Jusa- I don't think this line of argument is productive. ;)
They've had this argument 10,000 times, and I don't think Matthew's
position is going to change.
He fundamentally believes that ANY opennet system could be easily
blocked if the situation ever came to it. He has a good point, even if
y
On Friday 08 June 2007 14:31, Luke771 wrote:
> On bittorrent, I usually torify tracker connection but not p2p connections.
> That leaves me still vulnerable to my peers but makes it somewhat less
> easy to label my IP as 'evil file sharer' because monitoring the tracker
> won't show my real IP bu
On bittorrent, I usually torify tracker connection but not p2p connections.
That leaves me still vulnerable to my peers but makes it somewhat less
easy to label my IP as 'evil file sharer' because monitoring the tracker
won't show my real IP but a tor server.
By the way, am I the only one thin
We disagree on user behavior and motivation, and I accept that ;)
That said, we agree on what should be done, and that's what matters ;)
I just think that it might be time for you and Toad to decide to just
stop responding to Opennet-related posts. It seems like the same
arguments occur ad nause
* Colin Davis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2007-06-08 08:25:37]:
[snip.]
> I look at it, and know that opennet is necessary for the darknet to
> prosper.. Once Opennet is in place, people have a larger incentive to
> run Freenet. This means that they add permanent nodes, which is good.
Opennet will ad
On Fri, 08 Jun 2007 00:06:42 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> Nonetheless the general thrust of Jusa's argument was that there is no
> point having darknet. He's wrong. Opennet is a means to an end, not the be
> all and end all.
More to the point, I'm trying to argue that having a global darknet
Jusa- I don't think this line of argument is productive. ;)
They've had this argument 10,000 times, and I don't think Matthew's
position is going to change.
He fundamentally believes that ANY opennet system could be easily
blocked if the situation ever came to it. He has a good point, even if
y
On Fri, 08 Jun 2007 00:05:41 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> On Thursday 07 June 2007 21:23, Jusa Saari wrote:
>> On Wed, 06 Jun 2007 19:11:27 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
>> > Recent probe data suggests a theory:
>> >
>> > Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e.
>> > sub-ne
On Friday 08 June 2007 00:20, Ian Clarke wrote:
> On 6/7/07, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> > It doesn't matter
> > if we have an opennet that outperforms BitTorrent over Tor
>
> On that subject, NEVER try using BitTorrent over Tor unless for some
> reason you hate Tor and are trying to do a denial of
Nonetheless the general thrust of Jusa's argument was that there is no point
having darknet. He's wrong. Opennet is a means to an end, not the be all and
end all.
On Thursday 07 June 2007 22:34, Ian Clarke wrote:
> On 6/7/07, Florent Daigni?re wrote:
> > * Jusa Saari [2007-06-07 23:23:48]:
> >
On Thursday 07 June 2007 21:23, Jusa Saari wrote:
> On Wed, 06 Jun 2007 19:11:27 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> > Recent probe data suggests a theory:
> >
> > Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e. sub-networks
> > which are only weakly connected to the larger network. These
On Thu, Jun 07, 2007 at 11:23:48PM +0300, Jusa Saari wrote:
> On Wed, 06 Jun 2007 19:11:27 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
>
> > Recent probe data suggests a theory:
> >
> > Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e. sub-networks
> > which are only weakly connected to the larger n
On Wed, 06 Jun 2007 19:11:27 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> Recent probe data suggests a theory:
>
> Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e. sub-networks
> which are only weakly connected to the larger network. These cover a small
> chunk of the keyspace, say 0.36-0.41 (roug
* Jusa Saari [2007-06-07 23:23:48]:
> On Wed, 06 Jun 2007 19:11:27 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
>
> > Recent probe data suggests a theory:
> >
> > Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e. sub-networks
> > which are only weakly connected to the larger network. These cover a
Attached is a probe trace to support the below conclusions.
On Wednesday 06 June 2007 19:11, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> Recent probe data suggests a theory:
>
> Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e. sub-networks
> which are only weakly connected to the larger network. These co
On 6/7/07, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> It doesn't matter
> if we have an opennet that outperforms BitTorrent over Tor
On that subject, NEVER try using BitTorrent over Tor unless for some
reason you hate Tor and are trying to do a denial of service attack on
it.
Ian.
--
Founder and CEO, Thoof Inc
On Friday 08 June 2007 00:20, Ian Clarke wrote:
> On 6/7/07, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > It doesn't matter
> > if we have an opennet that outperforms BitTorrent over Tor
>
> On that subject, NEVER try using BitTorrent over Tor unless for some
> reason you hate Tor and are trying
On 6/7/07, Florent Daigni?re wrote:
> * Jusa Saari [2007-06-07 23:23:48]:
> Implementing a workaround (opennet, backtracking, ...) is only a way of
> fixing temporarily the topology to the expense of both liberty (it has
> to be the default behaviour as you pointed out) and safety (everyone
> kno
On 6/7/07, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> It doesn't matter
> if we have an opennet that outperforms BitTorrent over Tor
On that subject, NEVER try using BitTorrent over Tor unless for some
reason you hate Tor and are trying to do a denial of service attack on
it.
Ian.
--
Founder
On Thursday 07 June 2007 21:23, Jusa Saari wrote:
> On Wed, 06 Jun 2007 19:11:27 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> > Recent probe data suggests a theory:
> >
> > Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e. sub-networks
> > which are only weakly connected to the larger network. These
Nonetheless the general thrust of Jusa's argument was that there is no point
having darknet. He's wrong. Opennet is a means to an end, not the be all and
end all.
On Thursday 07 June 2007 22:34, Ian Clarke wrote:
> On 6/7/07, Florent Daignière <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > * Jusa Saari <[EMAIL
On Thu, Jun 07, 2007 at 11:23:48PM +0300, Jusa Saari wrote:
> On Wed, 06 Jun 2007 19:11:27 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
>
> > Recent probe data suggests a theory:
> >
> > Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e. sub-networks
> > which are only weakly connected to the larger n
On 6/7/07, Florent Daignière <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> * Jusa Saari <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2007-06-07 23:23:48]:
> Implementing a workaround (opennet, backtracking, ...) is only a way of
> fixing temporarily the topology to the expense of both liberty (it has
> to be the default behaviour as you p
* Jusa Saari <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2007-06-07 23:23:48]:
> On Wed, 06 Jun 2007 19:11:27 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
>
> > Recent probe data suggests a theory:
> >
> > Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e. sub-networks
> > which are only weakly connected to the larger netw
On Wed, 06 Jun 2007 19:11:27 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> Recent probe data suggests a theory:
>
> Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e. sub-networks
> which are only weakly connected to the larger network. These cover a small
> chunk of the keyspace, say 0.36-0.41 (roug
On Wed, Jun 06, 2007 at 11:44:32PM +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> On Wednesday 06 June 2007 22:19, vive wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 06, 2007 at 09:43:52PM +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> > > After a long discussion with vivee, new proposal:
> > > On a request, we should, in addition to HTL and best-s
On Wed, Jun 06, 2007 at 11:44:32PM +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> On Wednesday 06 June 2007 22:19, vive wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 06, 2007 at 09:43:52PM +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> > > After a long discussion with vivee, new proposal:
> > > On a request, we should, in addition to HTL and best-s
ired=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00,
> > FORGED_RCVD_HELO,USER_IN_WHITELIST autolearn=ham version=3.1.7-deb
> > From: Matthew Toseland
> > To: Discussion of development issues
> > Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2007 21:43:52 +0100
> > Subject: Re: [freenet-dev] Getting stuck down rab
ELIST autolearn=ham version=3.1.7-deb
> From: Matthew Toseland
> To: Discussion of development issues
> Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2007 21:43:52 +0100
> Subject: Re: [freenet-dev] Getting stuck down rabbit holes
>
> After a long discussion with vivee, new proposal:
> On a request, we
After a long discussion with vivee, new proposal:
On a request, we should, in addition to HTL and best-so-far, track the 3 best
locations of nodes we have seen, could have visited, but haven't.
When we run out of HTL, this indicates that we are either a) lost in a pocket,
or b) have actually rea
Recent probe data suggests a theory:
Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e. sub-networks which
are only weakly connected to the larger network. These cover a small chunk of
the keyspace, say 0.36-0.41 (roughly, in the trace I had). A request for 0.5
got stuck down the rabbi
ired=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00,
> > FORGED_RCVD_HELO,USER_IN_WHITELIST autolearn=ham version=3.1.7-deb
> > From: Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > To: Discussion of development issues
> > Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2007 21:43:52 +0100
> > Subject: Re: [freenet-dev]
Sounds promising, but you should whip up a quick simulation first to
confirm that it behaves as expected.
Ian.
On 6/6/07, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> Recent probe data suggests a theory:
>
> Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e. sub-networks which
> are only weakly connected
ELIST autolearn=ham version=3.1.7-deb
> From: Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: Discussion of development issues
> Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2007 21:43:52 +0100
> Subject: Re: [freenet-dev] Getting stuck down rabbit holes
>
> After a long discussion with vivee, new
After a long discussion with vivee, new proposal:
On a request, we should, in addition to HTL and best-so-far, track the 3 best
locations of nodes we have seen, could have visited, but haven't.
When we run out of HTL, this indicates that we are either a) lost in a pocket,
or b) have actually rea
Sounds promising, but you should whip up a quick simulation first to
confirm that it behaves as expected.
Ian.
On 6/6/07, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Recent probe data suggests a theory:
>
> Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e. sub-networks which
> are onl
Recent probe data suggests a theory:
Parts of the network are "rabbit holes" or "dungeons", i.e. sub-networks which
are only weakly connected to the larger network. These cover a small chunk of
the keyspace, say 0.36-0.41 (roughly, in the trace I had). A request for 0.5
got stuck down the rabbi
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