On 10/05/2013 02:20 AM, Jack Singleton wrote:
> Interesting that there is no mention of timing attacks...
>
> You would think with the amount of monitoring they are doing that it would
> be fairly simple to correlate traffic being sent to tor nodes with traffic
> leaving exit nodes.
This presenta
On Tue, 2013-10-08 at 22:49 +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 08, 2013 at 09:24:45PM +0200, Marco Calamari wrote:
> > On Sat, 2013-10-05 at 13:47 -0500, Ian Clarke wrote:
> > > This doesn't have anything to do with the Silk Road takedown, if that is
> > > what you are referring to.
> > >
On Tue, Oct 08, 2013 at 09:24:45PM +0200, Marco Calamari wrote:
> On Sat, 2013-10-05 at 13:47 -0500, Ian Clarke wrote:
> > This doesn't have anything to do with the Silk Road takedown, if that is
> > what you are referring to.
> >
> > The vulnerability there was "between keyboard and chair".
>
>
On Sat, 2013-10-05 at 13:47 -0500, Ian Clarke wrote:
> This doesn't have anything to do with the Silk Road takedown, if that is
> what you are referring to.
>
> The vulnerability there was "between keyboard and chair".
... not only, in this case also in software ...
2013 IEEE Symposium on Securi
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
It is ...
ISBEKAC? ;-)
"InSecurity BEtween Keyboard And Chair"
Roland
On 10/05/2013 08:47 PM, Ian Clarke wrote:
> This doesn't have anything to do with the Silk Road takedown, if
> that is what you are referring to.
>
> The vulnerability there was
This doesn't have anything to do with the Silk Road takedown, if that is
what you are referring to.
The vulnerability there was "between keyboard and chair".
Ian.
On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 1:26 PM, Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> Is MITM the right term?
>
> Not to be picky... but I thought they just pul
Is MITM the right term?
Not to be picky... but I thought they just pulled the server that was serving
up those particular hidden services and dropped in a new server with the
"identify all users" exploit [if they were not controlling that server in the
first place :-) ].
--
Robert Hailey
On
On 05/10/13 16:17, Ximin Luo wrote:
> Likely because other non-Tor-specific attacks (staining, pwning) that are
> mentioned, are way easier.
>
> They are probably working on it, though. Data centre in Utah, anyone?
>
> On 05/10/13 07:20, Jack Singleton wrote:
>> Interesting that there is no mentio
Likely because other non-Tor-specific attacks (staining, pwning) that are
mentioned, are way easier.
They are probably working on it, though. Data centre in Utah, anyone?
On 05/10/13 07:20, Jack Singleton wrote:
> Interesting that there is no mention of timing attacks...
>
> You would think wit
Interesting that there is no mention of timing attacks...
You would think with the amount of monitoring they are doing that it would
be fairly simple to correlate traffic being sent to tor nodes with traffic
leaving exit nodes.
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 1:34 PM, Ian Clarke wrote:
> This is very i
This is very interesting:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
Looks like it's not an attack on Tor itself, rather they identify Tor users
(which Tor isn't designed to prevent AFAIK), and then do a MITM on the
connection between Tor and the web to in
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