I've fiddled unsuccessfully with the Ceph storage system and the
similarly-named (but separate codebase) CephFS cluster filesystem. What I was
hoping for was a more broadly-supported/easier-to-install cluster technology
than OCFS2, that will hopefully work better than GlusterFS.
Before I give up
Sounds like Eric's solution and https://civicrm.org/ (which I believe the
FSF uses) would be good places to start investigating. Since Eric is
offering assistance, that makes his software even more compelling.
Will
On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 10:56 AM, Eric Chadbourne wrote:
> On 04/20/2014 05:33
Tom Metro wrote:
Anyone who read this thread will recall that my comments were in the
context of a certain class of errors.
Here's what you wrote:
That's a simplistic understanding of how crypto algorithms work. An
algorithm might consist of multiple layered state machines, and
triggering a f
Richard Pieri wrote:
> Google's methodology has not to my knowledge been publicized.
Correct.
>Tom Metro wrote:
>> Source code analysis has the potential to find these, if the code is
>> analyzed. Back-box testing will find them only if you are very lucky.
>
> This is laughably false. If it we
john saylor writes:
> On 4/22/14, 14:37 , Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
>> You're saying, that the only way anybody in the world can trust
>> anything, is to literally download everything from source, *read*
>> all the source, and compile it themselves.
>
> instead of just calling "bs" can you s
> From: Derek Martin [mailto:inva...@pizzashack.org]
>
> On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 06:37:51PM +, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
> > Supposing a bad guy writes software, open source, and makes it
> > available for download in source form as well as precompiled binary,
> > where he's compiled some
On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 06:37:51PM +, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
> Supposing a bad guy writes software, open source, and makes it
> available for download in source form as well as precompiled binary,
> where he's compiled some trojan into the binary.
Yes, this can happen. And only if the
On 4/22/14, 14:37 , Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
> You're saying, that the only way anybody in the world can trust anything, is
> to literally download everything from source, *read* all the source, and
> compile it themselves.
instead of just calling "bs" can you suggest some other means by w
> From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org [mailto:discuss-
> bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Derek Martin
>
> If you can't inspect it, you can't trust it. Period.
Supposing a bad guy writes software, open source, and makes it available for
download in source form as well
> From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org [mailto:discuss-
> bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Derek Martin
>
The first AES competition lasted 5 years, up to 2001. During that time,
several openly published ciphers were compared and scrutinized openly, and made
available
> From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org [mailto:discuss-
> bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Derek Martin
>
> Anything involving security or encryption is rarely simply anything.
Point?
> Hogwash. The difference is interested, qualified parties can't
> inspect the imple
Derek Martin wrote:
On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 06:37:03PM -0400, Richard Pieri wrote:
... but what it does isn't sync.
On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 09:49:15AM -0400, Richard Pieri wrote:
I didn't say that it doesn't do sync.
Must be a case of mass-halucination...
No, just you taking a phrase out
On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 06:37:03PM -0400, Richard Pieri wrote:
> ... but what it does isn't sync.
On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 09:49:15AM -0400, Richard Pieri wrote:
> I didn't say that it doesn't do sync.
Must be a case of mass-halucination...
--
Derek D. Martinhttp://www.pizzashack.org/ GPG
I really preferred the OpenTLS name that someone had suggested on the
OpenBSD mailing list.
On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 11:37 AM, Stephen Ronan wrote:
> "In the wake of Heartbleed, OpenBSD group is creating a simpler, cleaner
> version of the dominant OpenSSL."
> http://it.slashdot.org/story/14/04/22
Stephen Ronan writes:
> "In the wake of Heartbleed, OpenBSD group is creating a simpler,
> cleaner version of the dominant OpenSSL."
> http://it.slashdot.org/story/14/04/22/1240247/not-just-a-cleanup-any-more-libressl-project-announced
Would that use the Spanish or the French pronunciation of li
"In the wake of Heartbleed, OpenBSD group is creating a simpler,
cleaner version of the dominant OpenSSL."
http://it.slashdot.org/story/14/04/22/1240247/not-just-a-cleanup-any-more-libressl-project-announced
___
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htt
On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 11:40:58AM +, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
> > From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org [mailto:discuss-
> > bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Tom Metro
> >
> > Being open source [...]. It's
> > is merely a necessary precondition for determining t
Tom Metro wrote:
Steve Gibson discusses the timeline of the Heartbleed discovery. Google
researchers, presumably examining the code, found the problem several
weeks prior, and submitted patches to OpenSSL and fixed their own servers.
I choose not to make such assumptions. Google's methodology h
Greg Rundlett (freephile) wrote:
Well, according to the author Joey Hess, git-annex and git-annex
assistant do synchronization, sort of like an open source Dropbox... so
"it doesn't do sync" is subjective. It also handles arbitrarily large
I didn't say that it doesn't do sync. I said that Git
> From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org [mailto:discuss-
> bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Tom Metro
>
> Being open source [...]. It's
> is merely a necessary precondition for determining that crypto is
> trustworthy.
Sorry, but this statement is simply false.
Tell me t
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