Re: [Discuss] Steve Gibson's SQRL

2015-02-25 Thread Edward Ned Harvey (blu)
From: Discuss [mailto:discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Tom Metro SQRL Every authentication system, no matter what, is based on a combination of something you know, or something you have. Nothing against SQRL, but SQRL is something you have - it's yet another key

Re: [Discuss] Steve Gibson's SQRL

2015-02-25 Thread Richard Pieri
On 2/24/2015 9:35 PM, Tom Metro wrote: It uses a bit of PKI (using elliptic curve rather than RSA keys) and typically works in conjunction with a smartphone app. Here's the process: He's reinvented APOP. -- Rich P. ___ Discuss mailing list

Re: [Discuss] Steve Gibson's SQRL

2015-02-25 Thread Bill Ricker
On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 8:45 AM, Richard Pieri richard.pi...@gmail.com wrote: He's reinvented APOP. ​There's certainly a similarity. Using the same techniques outside of POP in a phone-and-browser setting is darn good idea. ​ -- Bill Ricker bill.n1...@gmail.com

Re: [Discuss] Steve Gibson's SQRL

2015-02-25 Thread Tom Metro
Edward Ned Harvey wrote: SQRL is something you have - it's yet another key manager... It's not quite so black-and-white. The master key is encrypted with a pass phrase, so that's something you know. I believe the master key isn't directly derived from the pass phrase, so you still need to have

Re: [Discuss] Steve Gibson's SQRL

2015-02-25 Thread Derek Atkins
Bill Ricker bill.n1...@gmail.com writes: On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 8:45 AM, Richard Pieri richard.pi...@gmail.com wrote: He's reinvented APOP. ​There's certainly a similarity. Using the same techniques outside of POP in a phone-and-browser setting is darn good idea. ​ tl;dr And how does

Re: [Discuss] Steve Gibson's SQRL

2015-02-25 Thread Tom Metro
Derek Atkins wrote: And how does one know that the authentication server URL is the right URL and not, say, a MitM/Fishing attack? It's addressed at length: https://www.grc.com/sqrl/phishing.htm In summary, there are several measures to combat several different attack scenarios: -one is that

Re: [Discuss] Steve Gibson's SQRL

2015-02-25 Thread Richard Pieri
On 2/25/2015 1:18 PM, Tom Metro wrote: also connect to the wrong end-point (though the attacker could proxy the connection). Which is trivially easy to do when providing victims with malicious URLs via malicious QR codes. -the domain in the URL is shown to the user for verification before

Re: [Discuss] Does anyone here know someone who's been victimized?

2015-02-25 Thread David Rosenstrauch
On 02/19/2015 02:21 PM, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote: I have spoken with two IT people, whose servers had been compromised and used to deliver some sort of illegal content, presumably sold from malicious person 1 to malicious person 2 on the black market (silk road or whatever). Of course