If early reject is not a problem, then perhaps this paragraph is not needed
at all. If it is present, it needs to communicate correctly to everyone,
including the new cybersecurity student. I see nothing in the language
which limits the warning to this one special case. I read it as a broad
st
I don't see that the current language is in any way limited to the soecial
case of only -ALL. I read it as a general warning.
On Fri, Feb 11, 2022, 11:26 AM John Levine wrote:
> It appears that Dotzero said:
> >> I agree with Ale. Further, it is not as if we are considering this in a
> >vacu
On 2022-02-11 17:25, John Levine wrote:
A bare -all is clearly a special case, the converse of null MX, that
means no mail at all. I agree the current wording is fine.
nullMX is supported from all mta, but spf is lotto
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It appears that Dotzero said:
>> I agree with Ale. Further, it is not as if we are considering this in a
>vacuum. Since originally being made public, DMARC has been widely
>implemented and it has not been identified that this (early reject on SPF
>-all) has been a significant or even an insignifi
On 2022-02-11 08:57, Douglas Foster wrote:
This section implies that publishing SPF -ALL is a risky move, which
is made worse by DMARC. SPF -ALL is a only risk when (a) the message
is forwarded without MAILFROM rewrite and (b) the evaluator does not
implement DMARC.
+1
Rather than telling s
On Fri, Feb 11, 2022 at 7:19 AM Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> On Fri 11/Feb/2022 08:57:17 +0100 Douglas Foster wrote:
> > This section implies that publishing SPF -ALL is a risky move, which is
> made
> > worse by DMARC.SPF -ALL is a only risk when (a) the message is forwarded
> > without MAILFROM r
On Fri 11/Feb/2022 08:57:17 +0100 Douglas Foster wrote:
This section implies that publishing SPF -ALL is a risky move, which is made
worse by DMARC.SPF -ALL is a only risk when (a) the message is forwarded
without MAILFROM rewrite and (b) the evaluator does not implement DMARC.
My reading of
This section implies that publishing SPF -ALL is a risky move, which is
made worse by DMARC. SPF -ALL is a only risk when (a) the message is
forwarded without MAILFROM rewrite and (b) the evaluator does not implement
DMARC.
Rather than telling senders to weaken their SPF policies, we need to mak
