Re: [DNSOP] [saag] [TLS] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC

2010-10-06 Thread Yaron Sheffer
People keep referring to the 100+ vendor CA jungle. It is somewhat impolite to point it out, but there are very few major vendors in this space, and these vendors have been implicated in some of the most publicized attacks. In some cases, hiding behind a "low-cost" brand name. In other words,

Re: [DNSOP] [saag] [pkix] [TLS] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC

2010-10-06 Thread Peter Gutmann
Michael StJohns writes: >DNSSEC seems to be picking on PKIX and vice versa - maybe the right answer is >both? Maybe the right answer is a paddling pool full of jello and Marquess of Queensberry rules? Peter (just adding to the available options a bit). _

Re: [DNSOP] [TLS] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC

2010-10-06 Thread Marsh Ray
On 10/05/2010 02:46 PM, Martin Rex wrote: The DNS admin that controls A can always get a perfectly valid certificate B issued and successfully impersonate all services offered on servers in his DNS domain. By most people's definition, it's not "unauthorized impersonation" if the DNS admin doe