Stephane, all,
[I feel cautious about continuing to cross-post this to dnsop as well
as dinrg - however, it does apply to both areas, so i'll keep both
groups in for now]
On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 10:37 AM Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
> I think that it is an important work because it brings the powe
Paul,
On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 7:47 PM Paul Wouters wrote:
> I think this document should be Experimental and not Standards Track?
I was torn when i did the first revision of this. I think it depends
on the stability of Decentralized Identifiers themselves. Once that
schema becomes widely used, i
On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 8:47 PM Melinda Shore
wrote:
> I think the question of whether or not to provide
> decentralized identifiers and whether or not this proposal
> delivers on the "decentralized" claim is out of our hands,
> as the core spec (which has a lot of additional problems)
> comes out
If this draft is approved, the new RFC will obsolete RFC 6944. RFC 6944, in
turn, updates eight other RFCs. As I interpret it, the new RFC will inherit
that role. I think that should be explicitly stated in the new RFC.
Yours,
Mats
---
Mats Dufberg
DNS Specialist, IIS
Mobile: +46 73 065 3899
h
DNSOP,
We have updated the TIMEOUT resource record draft based on the great feedback
from Mark Andrews, Joe Abley, Ted Lemon, and Paul Vixie. I think we have
addressed all of the comments except for the Date format concern from Mark.
That is still an outstanding issue. Please comment on it if y
I have yet to seen a justification for using SHAKE128 vs any of the existing
hash algorithms used in DNS. You really need to justify this choice on security
concerns. DNS server implementers need to support multiple crypto backends and
adding yet another algorithm is not as easy as just calling O
Mark,
> Just closing the issue isn’t addressing it.
That’s not a fair point about closing issue #19.
Your main concern was that SHA-3 algorithms might not be easily available but,
luckily, they shipped with TLS 1.3 in OpenSSL 1.1.1 and so I thought #19 was a
solved issue.
Regardless, sooner o
> On 19 Feb 2019, at 11:47 am, Tom Pusateri wrote:
>
> Mark,
>
>> Just closing the issue isn’t addressing it.
>
> That’s not a fair point about closing issue #19.
>
> Your main concern was that SHA-3 algorithms might not be easily available
> but, luckily, they shipped with TLS 1.3 in OpenS
