On 9/4/19 2:35 PM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
I've already talked with Christoph that we probably want to switch TTM
over to using that instead to also get rid of the ttm_io_prot() hack.
OK, would that mean us ditching other memory modes completely? And
on-the-fly caching transitions?
On 9/4/19 1:10 PM, Koenig, Christian wrote:
Am 04.09.19 um 10:19 schrieb Thomas Hellström (VMware):
Hi, Christian,
On 9/4/19 9:33 AM, Koenig, Christian wrote:
Am 03.09.19 um 23:05 schrieb Thomas Hellström (VMware):
On 9/3/19 10:51 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 9/3/19 1:36 PM, Thomas Hellström (V
On Wed, Sep 4, 2019 at 12:38 PM Thomas Hellström (VMware)
wrote:
>
> On 9/4/19 9:53 AM, Daniel Vetter wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 4, 2019 at 8:49 AM Thomas Hellström (VMware)
> > wrote:
> >> On 9/4/19 1:15 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >>> But, reading this, I have more questions:
> >>>
> >>> Can’t you
Am 04.09.19 um 10:19 schrieb Thomas Hellström (VMware):
> Hi, Christian,
>
> On 9/4/19 9:33 AM, Koenig, Christian wrote:
>> Am 03.09.19 um 23:05 schrieb Thomas Hellström (VMware):
>>> On 9/3/19 10:51 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 9/3/19 1:36 PM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
> So the questi
On 9/4/19 9:53 AM, Daniel Vetter wrote:
On Wed, Sep 4, 2019 at 8:49 AM Thomas Hellström (VMware)
wrote:
On 9/4/19 1:15 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
But, reading this, I have more questions:
Can’t you get rid of cvma by using vmf_insert_pfn_prot()?
It looks like that, although there are comment
On 9/4/19 10:19 AM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
Hi, Christian,
On 9/4/19 9:33 AM, Koenig, Christian wrote:
Am 03.09.19 um 23:05 schrieb Thomas Hellström (VMware):
On 9/3/19 10:51 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 9/3/19 1:36 PM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
So the question here should really
Hi, Dave,
On 9/4/19 1:10 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
Thomas, this series has garnered a nak and a whole pile of thoroughly
confused reviewers.
Could you take another stab at this along with a more ample changelog
explaining the context of the problem? I suspect that's a better place
to start than h
Hi, Christian,
On 9/4/19 9:33 AM, Koenig, Christian wrote:
Am 03.09.19 um 23:05 schrieb Thomas Hellström (VMware):
On 9/3/19 10:51 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 9/3/19 1:36 PM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
So the question here should really be, can we determine already at mmap
time whether ba
On Wed, Sep 4, 2019 at 8:49 AM Thomas Hellström (VMware)
wrote:
> On 9/4/19 1:15 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > But, reading this, I have more questions:
> >
> > Can’t you get rid of cvma by using vmf_insert_pfn_prot()?
>
> It looks like that, although there are comments in the code about
> seriou
Am 03.09.19 um 23:05 schrieb Thomas Hellström (VMware):
> On 9/3/19 10:51 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 9/3/19 1:36 PM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
>>> So the question here should really be, can we determine already at mmap
>>> time whether backing memory will be unencrypted and adjust the *rea
On 9/4/19 1:15 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Sep 3, 2019, at 3:15 PM, Thomas Hellström (VMware)
wrote:
On 9/4/19 12:08 AM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
On 9/3/19 11:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 2:05 PM Thomas Hellström (VMware)
wrote:
On 9/3/19 10:51 PM, Dave
> On Sep 3, 2019, at 3:15 PM, Thomas Hellström (VMware)
> wrote:
>
>> On 9/4/19 12:08 AM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
>>> On 9/3/19 11:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 2:05 PM Thomas Hellström (VMware)
>>> wrote:
On 9/3/19 10:51 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
>>
Thomas, this series has garnered a nak and a whole pile of thoroughly
confused reviewers.
Could you take another stab at this along with a more ample changelog
explaining the context of the problem? I suspect that's a better place
to start than having us all piece together the disparate parts of
On 9/4/19 12:08 AM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
On 9/3/19 11:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 2:05 PM Thomas Hellström (VMware)
wrote:
On 9/3/19 10:51 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 9/3/19 1:36 PM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
So the question here should really be, can
On 9/3/19 11:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 2:05 PM Thomas Hellström (VMware)
wrote:
On 9/3/19 10:51 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 9/3/19 1:36 PM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
So the question here should really be, can we determine already at mmap
time whether backing me
On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 2:05 PM Thomas Hellström (VMware)
wrote:
>
> On 9/3/19 10:51 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > On 9/3/19 1:36 PM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
> >> So the question here should really be, can we determine already at mmap
> >> time whether backing memory will be unencrypted and a
On 9/3/19 10:51 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 9/3/19 1:36 PM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
So the question here should really be, can we determine already at mmap
time whether backing memory will be unencrypted and adjust the *real*
vma->vm_page_prot under the mmap_sem?
Possibly, but that requi
On 9/3/19 1:36 PM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
> So the question here should really be, can we determine already at mmap
> time whether backing memory will be unencrypted and adjust the *real*
> vma->vm_page_prot under the mmap_sem?
>
> Possibly, but that requires populating the buffer with m
On 9/3/19 9:55 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 9/3/19 12:51 PM, Daniel Vetter wrote:
The thing we need to stop is having mixed encryption rules under one VMA.
The point here is that we want this. We need to be able to move the
buffer between device ptes and system memory ptes, transparently,
behind u
On 9/3/19 12:51 PM, Daniel Vetter wrote:
>> The thing we need to stop is having mixed encryption rules under one VMA.
> The point here is that we want this. We need to be able to move the
> buffer between device ptes and system memory ptes, transparently,
> behind userspace back, without races. And
On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 9:38 PM Dave Hansen wrote:
>
> This whole thing looks like a fascinating collection of hacks. :)
>
> ttm is taking a stack-alllocated "VMA" and handing it to vmf_insert_*()
> which obviously are expecting "real" VMAs that are linked into the mm.
> It's extracting some pgprot
This whole thing looks like a fascinating collection of hacks. :)
ttm is taking a stack-alllocated "VMA" and handing it to vmf_insert_*()
which obviously are expecting "real" VMAs that are linked into the mm.
It's extracting some pgprot_t information from the real VMA, making a
psuedo-temporary VM
From: Thomas Hellstrom
With TTM pages allocated out of the DMA pool, use the
force_dma_unencrypted function to be able to set up the correct
page-protection. Previously it was unconditionally set to encrypted,
which only works with SME encryption on devices with a large enough DMA
mask.
Tested w
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