I'd said:
But wouldn't that lose the method's FBC compliance? For FBC compliance, if
there are N candidates ranked over a particular candidate, then it's
necessary to give a vote to hat candidate in the (N+1)th round, and not
before.
Forest replies...
I think you are confusing FBC compliance w
In a paper by me which does not yet exist (unfinished), I proposed the "SARVO"
transformation to a voting system.
SARVO = Strategy Advisor based on Randomized Voter Order.
Specifically, it works as follows.
1. The voters input their votes,
plus they optionally can (as they do so) also push an
Required ballot information:
ordinal with tentative approval cutoff
Count:
For each candidate X recursively find the candidate X' that would win if X were
to withdraw.
On those ballots that rank X ahead of X', approve X. On those ballots that
rank X equal to X' approve X only if X is t
I'd previously said that, with MDDB, unopposed offensive order-reversal can
only succeed if the candidates' 1st choice strengths are in one particular
order. My hope was that the ratio of backfire-probability to
success-probability was greater for MDDB (and maybe MDD,ER-Buckling(whole)
than
I wrote ...
Ratings are a convenient way of providing for equal rankings and keeping the
ballots from becoming too unwieldy when there are large numbers of
candidates, as in a big election without primaries.
Mike replied:
But how is ratings more convenient than rankings? As long as the voters
un
Mike wrote
Forest--
You wrote:
If you use a range style ballot, and just go down one slot per Bucklin move,
then you could discard the majority defeated candidates. It might help
mitigate the Clone Winner problem, too.
I reply:
But wouldn't that lose the method's FBC compliance? For FBC
It is not possible for me to unconfuse somebody this massively confused.
I will therefore only point out a few things.
1. Lomax claims DH3 is a fantasy not seen in a real election & demands I cite a
historic
example. Perhaps that is because there has never been a real election held
using Condor