[EM] Forest--FBC compliance

2005-10-24 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
I'd said: But wouldn't that lose the method's FBC compliance? For FBC compliance, if there are N candidates ranked over a particular candidate, then it's necessary to give a vote to hat candidate in the (N+1)th round, and not before. Forest replies... I think you are confusing FBC compliance w

[EM] declared strategy voting / Sarvo-range voting

2005-10-24 Thread Warren Smith
In a paper by me which does not yet exist (unfinished), I proposed the "SARVO" transformation to a voting system. SARVO = Strategy Advisor based on Randomized Voter Order. Specifically, it works as follows. 1. The voters input their votes, plus they optionally can (as they do so) also push an

[EM] Has this simple to describe Declared Strategy Voting method ever been suggested (before now)?

2005-10-24 Thread Simmons, Forest
Required ballot information: ordinal with tentative approval cutoff Count: For each candidate X recursively find the candidate X' that would win if X were to withdraw. On those ballots that rank X ahead of X', approve X. On those ballots that rank X equal to X' approve X only if X is t

[EM] Reversal's success & backfire probabilities same for all pairwise-count methods

2005-10-24 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
I'd previously said that, with MDDB, unopposed offensive order-reversal can only succeed if the candidates' 1st choice strengths are in one particular order. My hope was that the ratio of backfire-probability to success-probability was greater for MDDB (and maybe MDD,ER-Buckling(whole) than

[EM] rating style ballots versus ranking style ballots for obtaining ordinal information

2005-10-24 Thread Simmons, Forest
I wrote ... Ratings are a convenient way of providing for equal rankings and keeping the ballots from becoming too unwieldy when there are large numbers of candidates, as in a big election without primaries. Mike replied: But how is ratings more convenient than rankings? As long as the voters un

[EM] FBC compliance

2005-10-24 Thread Simmons, Forest
Mike wrote Forest-- You wrote: If you use a range style ballot, and just go down one slot per Bucklin move, then you could discard the majority defeated candidates. It might help mitigate the Clone Winner problem, too. I reply: But wouldn't that lose the method's FBC compliance? For FBC

[EM] Lomax continues to be confused about DH3 and range voting

2005-10-24 Thread Warren Smith
It is not possible for me to unconfuse somebody this massively confused. I will therefore only point out a few things. 1. Lomax claims DH3 is a fantasy not seen in a real election & demands I cite a historic example. Perhaps that is because there has never been a real election held using Condor