At 02:01 PM 12/1/2005, James Gilmour wrote:
>What I had in mind was if I vote 1, 2, 3, 4 (1 = most preferred, the
>one I want to see win) for candidates A, B, C, D,
>and you vote 100, 99, 2, 1 (1 = most preferred) for the same four
>candidates, it would be fundamentally undemocratic if
>your vote
At 08:16 PM 12/1/2005, rob brown wrote:
>My wording was a bit sloppy, because it is true that condorcet
>SOMETIMES can reward insincere voting. It is not perfect. It is,
>in my opinion, really really closeclose enough that insincere
>voting will not have a significant effect on elections,
At 07:26 PM 12/1/2005, rob brown wrote:
>Plurality is bad, but not voting strategically in a plurality system
>makes it even worse, in my opinion.
I think Mr. Brown did not understand what was written. Jan had
indicated that he had no preference between the leading candidates.
If this was true
At 04:07 PM 11/29/2005, Paul Kislanko wrote:
>
> > Of course, with Asset Voting, the whole exercise becomes unnecessary.
> > Asset approaches the voting problem in an entirely different way. As
> > one way to vote Asset, pick the person who you would prefer for the
> > office, or, alternatively, wh
At 06:00 PM 12/1/2005, rob brown wrote:
>I cannot imagine a scenario where it doesn't make the most strategic
>sense to give your vote the maximum weight, assuming you vote at all.
Consider this a failure of imagination, not of range voting
On issue voting, one may have a weak opinion, and t
At no time did I ever say that "Condorcet is flawed". At
various times I said I was uncomfortable with the way some methods broke cycles,
and many times I said that claims made by people about it were
unproven.
It is not up to me to "prove" that someone else's unproven
assertion is false,
On 12/2/05, Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
The only thing I asked was for people who make logical or mathematicalclaims to prove them.No one wants to bother, so I don't care.Paul, you made claims that Condorcet was flawed, but refused to "prove" or even defend your complaints. While mayb
OK, I give up.
The only thing I asked was for people who make logical or mathematical
claims to prove them.
No one wants to bother, so I don't care.
There isn't a PaulK "method", there is a suggestion that descriptions and
proofs be axiomitized in such a way that claims can be explained
unambig
Warren,
--- Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Let me attempt to reply. First of all, by expressing ABCD in that order
> you
> *already* are expressing a more-strong preference for A over D
> than for, say, C over D. In many voting systems your vote would
> therefore have a stronger e
On Tue, 29 Nov 2005 12:32:29 -0600 Paul Kislanko wrote:
>
>
>>-Original Message-
>>From: Dave Ketchum [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>Sent: Monday, November 28, 2005 10:33 PM
>>To: Paul Kislanko
>>Cc: 'rob brown'; election-methods@electorama.com
>>Subject: Re: [EM] thoughts on the pairwise
On 12/2/05, Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
So you are deluded in thinking that your kind of voting is "more fundamentallydemocratic" because it "omits" strength of preference information."Deluded" is certainly a word that comes to mind regarding the suggestion that people will, in signific
Smith Sent: Friday, December 02, 2005 7:35 PM
> Exactly wrong! Social utility is THE overriding goal which
> trumps and encapsulates all else.
On this point we shall have to disagree. Just because you express your liking
for A and your dislike for B more
strongly than I do, does not mean your
>Gilmour:
>What I had in mind was if I vote 1, 2, 3, 4 (1 = most preferred,
the one I want to see win) for candidates A, B, C, D,
and you vote 100, 99, 2, 1 (1 = most preferred) for the
same four candidates, it would be fundamentally undemocratic if
your vote counted for more in determining the
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