Before everybody jumps all over me again, it is possible to determine the
Borda WINNER from the pairwise matrix using the method Chris described. But
it is not possible to re-create the Borda scores from it.
Nor is it possible to construct a pairwise matrix from just a list of the
Borda scores fo
I made a few typos in my replies to Venzke, but hopefully the reader can
mentally
corrct them.
The conclusion Venzke completely fialed in his attacks on my proofs, remains
in force.
Also in my reply to Rob Brown, I think I should not have said his
'fix" converted range (effectively, with strate
>Ok, I've made it pretty clear I am not a fan of Range Voting as it has been
presented. However, I could see it being done in a way that is fair and
does not encourage people to inadvertedly do something that is counter to
their interests.
Let's say that votes can range from 0 to 10. For simplic
I don't think Chris is right about this, unless the definitions for "total
votes for" and "total votes against" are defined in a way that isn't
included in his description.
If "total votes for" is the sum of votes in the row corresponding to the
alternative, and "total votes against" is the sum of
rob brown wrote:
> I don't see how you can do something as simple as a borda count with
> the data in a traditional matrix.
If you score each candidate by [(total votes for) minus (total
votes against)] then you will get the equivalent
of the Borda scores (i.e. the candidate with
Ok, well it sounds like the only way to fix range voting then is to just get rid of the in-between values and have approval.On 12/6/05, Kevin Venzke <
[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:Sorry, but you've made the best strategy even simpler, without reducing
the number of unwise voting options. One should jus
>WDS:
> Proof sketch:
> Because that winner X will be Condorcet winner.
> For each Y not in {A,B}, X is ranked above Y one-half of the time,
>Venzke:
One-half isn't a reasonable guess for this. You're not considering the
equal ranking at all.
--WDS: wrong.
one-half was not a "guess." It was an
> WDS: Thm 1.
> Suppose all the voters magically know the identity X of the
> max-summed-utility candidate.
> Suppose each voter votes approval-style by approving of all candidates
> with more utility
> than f*U_X, where U_X is X's utility (to that voter) and f is a constant
> (for example f=1
--- Jan Kok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I think the main technical problem with Approval is that it can be
> difficult to decide whether to vote for compromise candidates in
> addition to ones favorite. Does MDDA help?
The special thing about approval is that it forces simplicity. I see
the
Rob,
--- rob brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Ok, I've made it pretty clear I am not a fan of Range Voting as it has
> been presented. However, I could see it being done in a way that is fair
and
> does not encourage people to inadvertedly do something that is counter to
> their interests.
>
Quoting rob brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Ok, I've made it pretty clear I am not a fan of Range Voting as it has been
> presented. However, I could see it being done in a way that is fair and
> does not encourage people to inadvertedly do something that is counter to
> their interests.
Just a gue
Ok, I've made it pretty clear I am not a fan of Range Voting as it has been presented. However, I could see it being done in a way that is fair and does not encourage people to inadvertedly do something that is counter to their interests.
Let's say that votes can range from 0 to 10. For simplicit
> Warren Smith Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2005 7:48 PM
> JG, you have misunderstood me.
> I have never advocated that "the scores used by the voters
> could (or should) reflect the differences in their strengths
> of feeling, ie without obvious reference to any fixed scale."
>
> I have always a
Hello,
--- Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Warren,
>
> --- Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > Consider the following cheapo model of simulating an election. Each
> > candidate to
> > each voter has a utility which is an independent uniform random in the
> > interval [0,1]
Warren,
--- Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> But in this post we shall consider some rank-ballot voting methods that
> allow rank-equalities.
>
> Thm 7.
> Suppose we are using a Condorcet method but this time allowing
> rank-equalities.
> Suppose there are two random but pre-fixed c
Jan,
--- Jan Kok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> I'm having a hard time wrapping my head around MDDA, partly because
> I'm not sure about the definition. A candidate A must be ranked lower
> than some _specific_ candidate B on a majority of ballots in order to
> disqualify A ("ranked lower" would
Warren,
--- Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Consider the following cheapo model of simulating an election. Each
> candidate to
> each voter has a utility which is an independent uniform random in the
> interval [0,1].
> There are some fixed number C of candidates and some number V of
I'm having a hard time wrapping my head around MDDA, partly because
I'm not sure about the definition. A candidate A must be ranked lower
than some _specific_ candidate B on a majority of ballots in order to
disqualify A ("ranked lower" would include A not appearing on a ballot
while B appears on
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/PuzzlePage.html
currently contains 11 interesting puzzles related to voting.
Puzzles range from easy to difficult and in fact include two
open problems I do not know the answers to.
Answers are available by typing in a password; the password is
obtainable when you
>Gilmour:
If we have a fixed range scale, say 1 = least preferred, 1000 = most preferred,
it is perfectly obvi
ous that every voter
will mark 1 for his/her least preferred candidate, 1000 for his/her most
preferred candidate, and sc
ore the others
somewhere between the extremes. Then all voters
On 12/6/05, James Gilmour <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Rob, if there is any confusion it is in the original "maximises social utility" posts. The words in those messages didNOT make it clear or even suggest that the ranges should be recorded on a fixed scale - quite the contrary. That's what
starte
> rob brown Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2005 6:07 PM
> On 12/6/05, James Gilmour <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> This is the issue to which there has been no answer from
>> those who suggested it. There is no problem with fixed scale
>> range voting (because the fixed scale 'normalises' the
>> c
On 12/6/05, James Gilmour <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
This is the issue to which there has been no answer from those who suggested it. There is no problem with fixed scale range voting (because the fixed scale 'normalises' the contribution of every voter), but that is not what was proposed to maxim
More results about computer simulations of elections - without need of a
computer!
--Warren D Smith--Dec
2005
We continue to consider the following cheapo model of simulating an election.
Each candidate to
each voter has a utility which i
> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2005 4:19 AM
> To: election-methods@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] ignoring "strength of opinion"
>
> At 06:31 AM 12/3/2005, James Gilmour wrote:
> >So you think that just because I feel more strongly than you do in
> >my liking for A and my d
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