Much of the work on strategy-proofness and equilibria is only
about *individuals* not having an incentive to change their own
vote, given an assumption that no one else' vote will change.
That neglects the incentive for a (coordinated) group to change
their votes, as in Jan Kok's example
Jan wrote:
So, it seems an Approval election can have NO equilibrium, and
obviously there will often be ONE equilibrium. Question: can
there be more than one equilibrium?
Yes, but I believe it requires sincere tied preferences. Given
the sincere rankings
49:AB=C
21:BCA
30:CBA
there are two
"I'm a
little curious, since you seem to talk about multiple voters switching their
vote togethermaybe this really represents a situation where there are
multiple equilibriums, as opposed to no
equilibriums?"
On the surface, "multiple equilibria" is kind of an
oxymoron, but the notion
On 12/24/05, Paul Kislanko [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Rob Brown wrote: I'm a
little curious, since you seem to talk about multiple voters switching their
vote togethermaybe this really represents a situation where there are
multiple equilibriums, as opposed to no
equilibriums?
On the
I am definitely not intending an argument but once again
we've hit upon how slippery the language can be without proper
context.
In physical sciences, "there are 11 equilibria" would be
expressed as there is no "equilibrium but there are 11 stable solutions to the
system." Perhaps "never
