Anthony O'Neal wrote:> STV elects Andrea, Carter, and Deliliah. CPO-STV elects Andrea,> Carter, and Scott.>> Now let's compute the score for BTR-STV:>>I should point out that I proposed BTR-IRV as a slightly hacked IRV
>>that>>would never eliminate a Condorcet winner, in the hope that IRV >>suppo
From: Anthony O'Neal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Anthony O'Neal wrote:
> > (This is the election I pulled out of the Wikipedia article for
> CPO-STV.
> > I just didn't feel like making up an election where the results from
> > CPO-STV and STV differ right now. If you want to see how
> > the results for
Hello Raphael again!
> If so, there is an odd number of winners in that case, which might
> prove problematic.
For example:
2 abc
2 bca
3 cab
Starting with a uniform distribution, we get:
no. of
papers for
iterationabc
0111
17
Anthony O'Neal wrote:
> STV elects Andrea, Carter, and Deliliah. CPO-STV elects Andrea,
> Carter, and Scott.
>
> Now let's compute the score for BTR-STV:
I should point out that I proposed BTR-IRV as a slightly hacked IRV that
would never eliminate a Condorcet winner, in the hope that IRV support
Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> This is not independent of cloning ... in a big way :).
>
>What makes you think so? Assuming we add a clone y of x so that all
>voters have x and y neighboured in their ranking and so that the new
>initial proportions of papers naming either x or y is the same a
Forest wrote:
> 2 % approve A only.
> 25 % approve both A and B
> 23 % approve C only.
>
> But note that (in the sample) every ballot that approves B also
> approves A. If this is a real feature of the population, it will be
> impossible for B to get more approval than A.
>
> I think I would put
Anthony O'Neal wrote: > (This is the election I pulled out of the Wikipedia article for CPO-STV. > I just didn't feel like making up an election where the results from > CPO-STV and STV differ right now. If you want to see how
> the results for the CPO-STV and STV results were arriv
Dear Raphael!
You wrote:
> This is not independent of cloning ... in a big way :).
What makes you think so? Assuming we add a clone y of x so that all
voters have x and y neighboured in their ranking and so that the new
initial proportions of papers naming either x or y is the same as the
origina
At 01:57 AM 6/8/2006, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>On Wed, 07 Jun 2006 12:32:55 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>[...]
>
>Your words show there are TWO views of complexity:
> Ranked choice (IRV and Condorcet) have ballots that are messy
> to count by hand - but we can program computers to do the wor
Simmons, Forest <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> For the purposes of this message, a lottery is a stack of papers of
standard
> copier size (8.5 inch by 11 inch) such that each paper has the name
of exactly
> one candidate typed on it.
>
> This stack of papers is a lottery in the sense that a sheet o
In the standard peer assembly election method, the only
way to kick the incumbent government out of office is to
give the opposition parties control of the legislature.
This means that there is resistance to kicking out
corrupt/lazy incumbents as it could shift the balance
to parties that would be
Dear Forest!
That's an interesting game.
Do you agree that the "natural" (and perhaps optimal) behaviour for
voter i would be the following:
Assume that
n is the number of voters,
p(x) is the proportion of original papers naming x,
p(i,x) is the proportion of papers naming x returned by i,
P(i,
Simmons, Forest <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> For the purposes of this message, a lottery is a stack of papers of
standard
> copier size (8.5 inch by 11 inch) such that each paper has the name
of exactly
> one candidate typed on it.
>
> This stack of papers is a lottery in the sense that a sheet o
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>
>
> To take a real-world recent example, on Tuesday we had a gubernatorial
> primary election in California to choose party candidates for the
> November general election. In the Democratic primary, there were half
> a dozen candidates, but only two with a chance of wi
For the purposes of this message, a lottery is a stack of papers of standard
copier size (8.5 inch by 11 inch) such that each paper has the name of exactly
one candidate typed on it.
This stack of papers is a lottery in the sense that a sheet of paper can be
drawn at random from the stack to
The Center for Range Voting is now located at
http://www.rangevoting.org
please alter ay hyperlinks you may have. Last I checked
google was still unaware of the new location, although the
old location does transfer you to the new one.
Warren D Smith
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works
At 1:57 AM -0400 6/8/06, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>If I understand complaints about troublemaking, Tom and his friends,
>SOMEHOW knowing how all others will vote, vote a pattern that will change
>the winner, without directly voting their desire.
> How do they manage this without Dick ad HIS friend
<< I choke on your collection of methods: >>
What kind of comment is that? If you disagree with something,
just say so and explain why. Hyperemotionalistic comments
like this just muddy the waters and don't clarify anything except
the apparently agitated state of the writer's mind. They are
also d
Sorry, hit reply instead of reply all.
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> the most significant election cost, which is often
>neglected, is voter time at the voting booth and waiting to get
> there. This cost is enormous, it dwarfs, in fact, in value, what is
> normally spent on ca
At 01:57 AM 6/8/2006, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>I choke on your collection of methods:
>
>Imposing both range and ranked choice demands that the voter consider both
>methods. It also complicates the ballot and the counting.
Ranked information can be extracted from a Range ballot. If someone
doesn't w
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