Let D1 be the candidate whose maximum pairwise opposition is minimum, in
other words the MMPO winner.
We could say that D1 is a good defensive candidate because she minimizes the
number of votes scored against her by any other candidate.
Similarly, let O1 be the candidate whose minimum scor
Check this out:
http://counterpunch.org/husseini10192006.html
Thanks,
Forest
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election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Oct 18, 2006, at 23:55 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I assume you mean the "later no harm" property?
Yes, but also any other variants that fall between IRV and Condorcet.
> In effect, this means that you cannot look at a later choice on a
> ballot until you are sure one of the following 3 co
On Thu, 19 Oct 2006 06:43:37 -0400 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> > Given:
> > 35 A>C
> > 33 B>C
> > 32 C
> >
> > I see:
> > IRV will discard C, letting A win.
> > Condorcet will see 65 C winning over 35 A
> >
>
> The point is that the later no harm
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Given:
> 35 A>C
> 33 B>C
> 32 C
>
> I see:
> IRV will discard C, letting A win.
> Condorcet will see 65 C winning over 35 A
>
The point is that the later no harm property means that there is no
incentive to truncate yo
