--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> C
> 31% of +2 -> log(7)=0.84
> 69% of +1 -> log(6)=0.78
>
> Expected: 0.80
>
> D
> 45% of -1 -> log(4)=0.60
> 55% of +4 -> log(9)=0.95
>
> Expect: 0.79
>
The numbers labeled Expected: and Expect: are the expected utility of
the random event. It is
I've been realizing just how defective the Majority Criterion is.
People tend to assume that the Majority Criterion is an important
characteristic of any proper democratic election system. Yet the
Criterion itself suffers from a number of serious problems.
(1) It is clear that any method which
At 05:12 PM 11/1/2006, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>This is why insurance companies exist. People pay say 1%
>of the value of a thing in order to insure against a risk
>that is say 1 in 200 of happening. The expected benefit of
>the insurance is less than the cost, but it is still worth
>getting.
On Wed, 1 Nov 2006 18:16:57 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Dave,
>
> --- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>
>D. Zero-info Approval strategy. The voter gives a 10 to every
candidate
>at least as good as the average value of all candidates, and gives a
>0 to t
Juho,
--- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Example 1. Large party voters consider C better than the other large
> party candidate, but not much.
>
> 45: L>>C>R
> 40: R>>C>L
> 15: C>L=R
>
> Ranked Preferences elects L. (first round: L=-10, C=-70, R=-20;
> second round: L=-10, R=-20)
In m
Ranked Preferences adds strength of preferences to the flat
preferences of Condorcet methods. Here are some examples in which
this increased expressiveness may be of use in practical elections.
All the examples deal with two big party candidates and one
compromise candidate. I'll call them R
David Cary <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: --- Antonio Oneala <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, on 10/24/2006 wrote:> David Cary <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Besides its severely> > limited range of application, the other major> > drawback of the proposed method is that it is not proportional.> > I have no idea ho
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> At 11:28 AM 11/1/2006, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >51% chance of getting $200
> >100% chance of getting $100
>
> That depends on unstated conditions. However, the second choice must be consid
ered the baseline, since it is 100%. It is as if we start with $100. Shall we
At 11:28 AM 11/1/2006, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>51% chance of getting $200
>100% chance of getting $100
That depends on unstated conditions. However, the second choice must
be considered the baseline, since it is 100%. It is as if we start
with $100. Shall we bet it with an expected average ret
At 10:52 AM 11/1/2006, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>I have seen more concern that voters
>will vote the opposite way: Commit to a favorite candidate and cut
>off any chance of even electing the second favorite.
It should be kept in mind that Approval is a practically no-cost
reform. It adds maybe half th
raphfrk,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> > > A voter might be willing to use option C even though D gives a
> better
> > > expected value.
> >
> > In my opinion, if the voter prefers to vote option C than option D,
> > because h
Dave,
--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> >> > D. Zero-info Approval strategy. The voter gives a 10 to every
> >>candidate
> >> > at least as good as the average value of all candidates, and gives a
> >> > 0 to the others.
> >> >
> >>Interpreting, I see, as a common case, a couple tol
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> > A voter might be willing to use option C even though D gives a better
> > expected value.
>
> In my opinion, if the voter prefers to vote option C than option D,
> because he doesn't want to risk the -1 outcome, then he has not
>
Raphfrk,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> I was thinking, has anyone looked at the effects of risk aversion on
> voter strategy?
>
> In the above example, the voter might be faced with deciding which
> strategy to use:
>
> C
> 31% of +2
> 69% of +1
>
> Expected: 1.31
>
> D
> 45% o
> A. Sincere. This voter rates the candidates sincerely even if this means
> he doesn't use the top or bottom ratings.
> B. Maximized sincere. This is the same as A, except that the best and
> worst candidates are moved to the 10 and 0 positions, in order to
> maximize the weight between these
On Tue, 31 Oct 2006 19:43:13 -0500 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 12:19 AM 10/31/2006, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>This certainly DOES NOT earn a need for special assistance to such a voter.
>>
>>Whatever information may be available, if the voter does not know enough
>
>>from it to HAVE a pers
On Tue, 31 Oct 2006 16:22:56 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hello,
>
> -- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>
>>Quoting from below:
>> >
>> > These results suggest to me that in the zero-info case, if there are
>> > thought to be more than about 2 other voters, Range should be voted
>
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