At 06:14 AM 11/1/2006, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>A normal election is usually not close enough to a tie for what ONE voter
>does to make a difference. If, generally, the collection of voters that
>consider A and B tolerable vote your strategy, A and B can tie; if each
>who has a clear preference votes
Juho,
> You mentioned "strongest indicated preference gap" as the approval
> cut. How about defining it dynamically so that one would find the
> strongest preference relation that still has non-eliminated
> candidates at both sides of it? (like in RP)
CB: I did. Or if I didn't make it clea
On Nov 3, 2006, at 19:50 , Chris Benham wrote:
> Juho wrote:
>> On Nov 2, 2006, at 1:29 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
>>> Juho, --- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
Example 1. Large party voters consider C better than the other
large party candidate, but not much. 45: L>>C>R 40: R>>C>L 15:
Sorry about re-sending this. I forgot to change the title, and this
post has nothing to do with the previous title.
http://rangevoting.org/PropRep.html
"You want to get both best possible quality & accountability and best
possible representation"
This is an interesting point. Wh
I am reposting this from my post at the rangevoting list (slightly
modified).
http://rangevoting.org/PropRep.html
"You want to get both best possible quality & accountability and best
possible representation"
This is an interesting point. What about an assembly elected as follows:
The
Juho,
Juho wrote:
On Nov 2, 2006, at 1:29 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
Juho,
--- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
Example 1. Large party voters consider C better than the other large
party candidate, but not much.
45: L>>C>R
40: R>>C>L
15: C>L=R
Ranked Preferences el
