In the outlying areas of two or more color fuzz the mixed colors are
effectively getting tied all the time and a random winner among the
tied winners chosen, thus random fuzz.
These areas usually occur when the center of the population is more
than one standard deviation away from all of the
Seems we are more into skills in writing English, than into programming.
We have 15 voters, with an election summable as:
7C>5B - with original vote
7B>5A - unchanged
7A>5C - " - completes a cycle that is a tie.
8B>7C - modified vote that makes B winner with NO cycle.
Here
The (now with random tiebreaking) Bolson pictures pretty interesting.
Approval with mean-as-threshold (at least with Bolson's utility function)
is doing some pretty weird stuff! But "approval with poll" looks
very well behaved, at least in these examples (although I do not think
it'll be that nice
On Fri, 22 Dec 2006, Warren Smith wrote:
> Approval with mean-as-threshold seemed to "look bad" in the sense that
> it could prevent some candidates from ever winning, and make their winning
> regions
> lie far away from them if they existed. (This is assuming I believe the
> pictures
> I saw,
Michael,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> According to wikitest.electorama.com, later-no-harm is incompatible with
> the Condorcet criterion. Is there a general proof or a set of examples
> illustrating this? Plus, are there any examples not involving circular
> ties?
Douglas Woodall showed this
Tim,
--- Tim Hull <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> DSC uses a somewhat interesting method - it effectively goes and excludes
> the groups of candidates that the most people prefer a "solid coalition"
> to
> until it finds a winner. However, what I am wondering is - what are the
> primary flaws of
According to wikitest.electorama.com, later-no-harm is incompatible with
the Condorcet criterion. Is there a general proof or a set of examples
illustrating this? Plus, are there any examples not involving circular
ties?
Thanks!
Michael Rouse
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
election-methods mailing lis
Warren,
--- Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Approval with mean-as-threshold seemed to "look bad" in the sense that
> it could prevent some candidates from ever winning, and make their
> winning regions
> lie far away from them if they existed.
We know that Approval is a method that r
DSC uses a somewhat interesting method - it effectively goes and excludes
the groups of candidates that the most people prefer a "solid coalition" to
until it finds a winner. However, what I am wondering is - what are the
primary flaws of these two methods (especially as compared with IRV, of
whi
Raphfrk,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> Btw, how hard is it to calculate the voronoi diagram ?
I think it is pretty hard. I also doubt I can afford to calculate
a Voronoi diagram of voters for every election, since the point of it
is supposed to be to save time.
> It might be interesting to
Tim,
--- Tim Hull <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> At this point, I'd say the choice is between IRV/STV and some form of
> range/approval voting (for single and multi-winner elections). The issue
> of
> later-no-harm may come into play, though, and cause IRV/STV to be the
> choice... As it is, st
[EM] RE : Comments on the Yee/Bolson/et.al. pictures
Voronoi diagram of N points in plane is computable in O(NlogN) time
by methods that are nowadays standard. (See Preparata & Shamos book,
Mulmuley book, etc; also equivalent thing [but planar dual]
is "Delaunay triangulation".)
Not a trivial
The method sounds interesting and all... but I think we're going to end up
doing something a little more *traditional* in this regard. Asset voting et
al is off the table - though it does sound like an interesting idea.
At this point, I'd say the choice is between IRV/STV and some form of
range/
> That said, I really don't like the process of asset voting - which seems
> like a separate idea than proxies. This is because it takes control away
> from the voter in much the same way party lists do except that each
> candidate is effectively a "party". It sounds like an interesting sy
Btw, how hard is it to calculate the voronoi diagram ?
It might be interesting to have the simulation automatically overlay
the voronoi diagram lines on the results (maybe have it as a switch).
This assumes there is concensus that the voronou digram is the optimal
result.
Raphfrk
---
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 3. Random tie-breaking is essential so all candiate winnign chances are
> always
> 100% independent of the candidate-ordering.
Definately.
> 4. I find Venzke's discovery with a 10-candidate set that "IRV tends to favor
> outsiders"
> whereas "Approval(mean-ba
Too late at night to remember exactly what LNH means but, assuming it
REALLY calls IRV better than Condorcet, I have to offer a compensating
example.
Given:
37 A
31 B33B>32C while 65C>37A).
2 C - C still wins.
What it all means: Condorcet looks at all that the voters say, while IRV
Warren,
--- Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> 4. I find Venzke's discovery with a 10-candidate set that "IRV tends to
> favor outsiders"
> whereas "Approval(mean-based cutoff) tends to favor centrists" very
> interesting.
> But it needs more investigation with (a) more random 10-point s
18 matches
Mail list logo
