[EM] defining the "median voter" when the issue space is not one dimensional

It has been pointed out from time to time that when the voters and candidates all lie along the same one-dimensional spectrum of opinion, then the Condorcet winner is the top preference of the medium voter. [This assumes that there are an odd number of voters, or that the two voters next to the

[EM] RE : Benham "zero info strategy = honesty" criterion

Warren, --- Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Range voting is criticized for disobeying this criterion. > Meanwhile mot rank-ballot systems lik Condorcet, Borda, and IRV > obey it (apparently; I only have proof for Borda). Chris Benham doesn't claim that all rank methods (esp. all Con

Re: [EM] Benham "zero info strategy = honesty" criterion

Warren Smith wrote: >Range voting is criticized for disobeying this criterion. >Meanwhile mot rank-ballot systems like Condorcet, Borda, and IRV >obey it (apparently; I only have proof for Borda). > >BUT do they? It seems to me that in many Condorcet systems in which >equal rankings are permit

[EM] Benham "zero info strategy = honesty" criterion

Range voting is criticized for disobeying this criterion. Meanwhile mot rank-ballot systems lik Condorcet, Borda, and IRV obey it (apparently; I only have proof for Borda). BUT do they? It seems to me that in many Condorcet systems in which equal rankings are permitted, your best zero info vote