Peter,
--- Peter de Blanc [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
last year, Marcello Herreshoff and I worked on a voting method which we
called Hay Voting (after our friend Nick Hay). There's a description of
the method online here:
http://www.spaceandgames.com/?p=8
Can you give an example of how
Hi,
--- Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Kevin,
My last message was a copy of one I sent to EM. You may want to
reply on-list.
Oops. Thanks. Here it is below, with one change and one addition:
--- Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Chris,
--- Chris Benham [EMAIL
At 06:23 PM 1/19/2007, Ken Kuhlman wrote:
That's not the only possible solution. Indeed, the solution has been
known as in widespread use for a long, long time. It's called
Robert's Rules of Order, and the chair is the equivalent of a
moderator; the members of the meeting have absolute authority
At 12:33 PM 1/19/2007, Ken Kuhlman wrote:
Perhaps there's another method of organizing the group that can help
alleviate some of the pain, however. I recently ran across the free
list serving site Nabble, which has an innovative solution to these
problems. Take a look at www.nabble.com,
Here is the current CRV web page about this problems and its (lack of) solution
We are speaking about puzzle #5 at
http://www.rangevoting.org/PuzzlePage.html
---
Puzzle #5: Voting systems immune to clones and avoiding favorite-betrayal
Puzzle:
Two desirable properties of a voting system -
Ken Kuhlman wrote, quoting and replying to Abd ul-Rahman Lomax:
Does anyone have experience with Nabble, or know of other reasonable
solutions to this problem? It's time we stop pretending the problem
doesn't exist.
At this stage, there is a simple solution. I've got the flu today and
a
Warren Smith wrote:
Here is the current CRV web page about this problems and its (lack of) solution
We are speaking about puzzle #5 at
http://www.rangevoting.org/PuzzlePage.html
---
Puzzle #5: Voting systems immune to clones and avoiding favorite-betrayal
Puzzle:
Two desirable properties
Dear List,
Here are some references to papers where complexity issues (in a
variety of senses) involving fairness questions are raised:
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/botrender.fcgi?
blobtype=htmlartid=33742
http://www.cs.rochester.edu/u/lane/political-science.html
Benham: By this definition Range fails ICC because voters can only express
preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of
them, thus making it
possible that if a narrow winner is replaced by a set of clones all the
clones lose.
--no. The definition in the problem
At 04:06 PM 1/20/2007, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You aren't being harsh at all. In fact, to say that Lomax's response
isn't good enough is putting it mildly. There is no excuse at all,
not the flu or anything else, for dismissing one idea and asserting
the superiority of an alternative idea without
At 05:00 PM 1/20/2007, Chris Benham wrote:
By this definition Range fails ICC because voters can only express
preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of
them, thus making it
possible that if a narrow winner is replaced by a set of clones all the
clones lose.
Now,
I finally got around to computing them.
The attached spreadsheet contains the Spearman biases of the
apportionments using the historical House sizes and apportionment
populations.
I plan on adding some non-divisor methods later.
Year,Jefferson,Webster,Ossipoff,Hill,Dean,Adams
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