Sure, Condorcet fails Participation. And of course it would be better to not
fail Participation. But Partilcipation isn't about a strategy dilemma. It's
about an embarrassment. You know that no method can aviod embarrassments of
some kind or other. You know, that goes back to Kenneth Arrow.
Warren quoted me:
I advocate Range over Condorcet, as a public proposal. Assigning points from
1 to 10 is already familiar to people..
I reply now:
Well, lets say that RV is probably more winnable. But I now feel that its
better to be more ambitious and ask for SSD. But, if it should
Jobst Heitzig:
Sorry, but you have overlooked the no one falsifies a preference
clause: In your example, the third voter does falsify a preference.
Y
--WDS: In that case, as I said, Ossipoff's SFC definition reduces to
the requirement that the mehtod be a Condorcet method:
SFC: If no one
Indeed,
SFC: If no one falsifies a preference, and there's a CW, and a
majority of all the voters
prefer the CW to candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn't win.
here is a stronger property:
SFC2: if there's a CW, and no one falsifies, then the CW wins.
And this property is
Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Sure, Condorcet fails Participation. And of course it would be better
to not fail Participation. But Partilcipation isn't about a strategy
dilemma. It's about an embarrassment. You know that no method can
aviod embarrassments of some kind or other. You know, that
Warren Smith wrote:
SFC: If no one falsifies a preference, and there's a CW, and a
majority of all the voters
prefer the CW to candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn't win.
I must say, SFC is then rather silly.
It says if no one falsifies a preference redundantly
At 12:41 PM 2/10/2007, Warren Smith wrote:
WDS: In IEVS, presently, equal rankings are forbidden in rank-order methods.
MO: which (like Warren's other assumptions) makes the results meaningless.
--WDS: While I agree it would be nice if IEVS did equal rankings,
and I plan to make
a future
