Dear Forest,
you wrote:
> I have one question, though. If best strategy is to report true
> utilities, then what do you mean by encouraging compromise?
>
> You must mean compromise in the outcome as opposed to compromise in the
> ballots.
That's true. By "compromise" I mean the transfer of two vo
Id said:
But I use Partilcipation when comparing Approval to IRV. Some say that's
dishonest, to use Participation when my favorite method, Condorcet, fails
Participation.
Someone replies:
I would say that it is somewhat misleading and inconsistent, and
counter-productive to the goals
Lomax says:
Nevertheless, Warren has a point. He states conclusion based on thin
evidence, yes. But he does this when there, essentially, is *no* other
evidence.
I reply:
No, not really. There is evidence that no one here proposes Condorcet
without equal rankings. Strong evidence, in fact.
Lomax quotes Warren:
At 12:41 PM 2/10/2007, Warren Smith wrote: > >WDS: In IEVS, presently, equal
rankings are forbidden in rank-order methods. > >MO: which (like Warren's
other assumptions) makes the results meaningless. > >--WDS: While I agree it
would be nice if IEVS did equal rankings, >
Kevin said:
Hi, By the way, you can also ensure a method satisfies SFC by having it
comply with this votes-only criterion: "If more than half of the voters rank
A over B, but there is no majority of the voters ranking some third
candidate over A, then B doesn't win."
I reply:
First, does K
Warren says:
Indeed, > "SFC: If no one falsifies a preference, and there's a CW, and a >
majority of all the voters > prefer the CW to candidate Y, and vote
sincerely, then Y shouldn't win." here is a stronger property: SFC2: if
there's a CW, and no one falsifies, then the CW wins. And this p
ok, sorry for my dimness here.
Thanks to Benham and Venzke we now have two readable definitions of SFC:
Benham-SFC: "If more than half the voters vote X over Y and it is possible to
complete truncated ballots in a way to make X the CW, then Y must not win."
Venzke-SFC: "If more than half of the
Jobst,
I'm still digesting your new method. It is starting to make sense to
me. It is extremely creative and ingenious, in my opinion. I just hope
that we haven't overlooked any subtle logical error.
I have one question, though. If best strategy is to report true
utilities, then what do you
Hi,
By the way, you can also ensure a method satisfies SFC by having it
comply with this votes-only criterion: "If more than half of the voters
rank A over B, but there is no majority of the voters ranking some third
candidate over A, then B doesn't win."
Personally I feel that SFC *is* more ab
Dear friends,
Hay voting was supposedly the first known method under which it is
always optimal (as judged from expected utility) to vote sincere ratings
(i.e. ratings proportional to true utility). However, it seems that it
is a rather inefficient method (as judged from total expected utility)
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Note that, if I am correct, Condorcet himself received criticism of
> his method based on a comment about strategic voting. He dismissed
> it, saying that his method was for honest voters.
That should be Borda. Quoting Wikipedia:
"In respo
--WDS: In that case, as I said, Ossipoff's SFC definition reduces to
the requirement that the mehtod be a Condorcet method:
"SFC: If no one falsifies a preference, and there's a CW, and a majority of
all the voters
prefer the CW to candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn't win."
I m
At 04:50 AM 2/12/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>Warren is investing significant effort in simulations - GREAT, for
>there is hope for learning something useful with such.
>
>BUT, Warren is CLAIMING be making valid comparisons among methods
>via the simulations. When we find that there are difference
Ossipoff: But if Warren has a quibble about what it means to fully vote X
over Y, then
I refer him to my criteria SFC, GSFC, and SDSC.
--WDS: here is the definition of SFC given by Ossipoff (CW=Condorcet
winner):
"SFC: If no one falsifies a preference, and there's a CW, and a majority
of al
Warren is investing significant effort in simulations - GREAT, for there
is hope for learning something useful with such.
BUT, Warren is CLAIMING be making valid comparisons among methods via the
simulations. When we find that there are differences between the
simulated voting and real voting,
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