Duverger's words on this:
http://rangevoting.org/DuvTrans.html
Warren D Smith
http://rangevoting.org
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
This is for those that didn't see this proposal buried in the details
of a longer posting. There it was called method 1' . Here I'll call
it UncAA for reasons that I will explain later:
>From each covered candidate draw an arrow to the most approved
candidate that covers it. Then start with
Chris B. should get more credit for MCA than I, since he has been more
active in bringing it to the fore.
What about 3-slot MAMPO?
Which would be better, 3-slot MAMPO or the following hybrid of MCA and
MAMPO?
Ballots are 3-slot.
If exactly one candidate gets into the highest slot on more than
Juho> Sent: 22 February 2007 06:29
> On Feb 22, 2007, at 5:50 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
> > STAY AWAY from US Presidential elections. The Electoral College
> > offers too many complications to live with for this effort.
>
> Ok, let it be UK then, electing a MP (excluding at least the
> Scottish Pa
Right after I pointed out that Ossipoff was repeating a falsehood
about Condorcet, and went to the trouble of making an executive summary webpage
to correct him in less space
http://rangevoting.org/BlackSExec.html
Ossipoff then repested the same falsehood AGAIN 17 hours later.
How long will
Martin Bailey suggested "maximise the probability of minimising harm" as the
method to combine utility functions into a single social decision.
For something like this to work, there would need to be a reference point as
the question then becomes, "minimise harm relative to what?".
Anywa
One thing that I forgot to mention when I posted before about this: In the
U.S. at least, the issues are strongly linked. People's opinions on them are
strongly correlated. That's because an authoritarian is going to be
authoritarian on everything, typically.
So a 1-dimensional issue-space isn
The first things that stands out about Juhos example is the fact that there
is no majority preferring B to C. So one could ask in what way it is a
problem for C to win instead of B.
C is the favorite of only one voter? We dont claim to be choosing the
winner by Plurality. Condorcet chooses
Just forwarding my reply:
> --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Jan Kok" wrote:
> >
> > 1. Different strategy calculations by voters under the two systems.
> > Voters who like a "third party" candidate seem more willing to vote
> > for their favorite in the first round of TTR, than corresponding
>MCA is Forest's method, unless you've made some change to it...
--oh. Sorry, I thought it was from Benham. Anyhow, it is this:
canddt with most-2approvals wins if gets >50%, else regular approval-winner wins
where there are 3 kinds of votes: disapprove, approve, and 2approve (a higher
level
Warren,
--- Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> The high-SU methods include range voting, Brian Olson's IRNR system, and
> range+top2runoff,
> and Benham's MCA system (a 3-slot approval-like method).
MCA is Forest's method, unless you've made some change to it...
> Approval Voting using
I suggest to Mike Ossipoff that after I point out to him that
I refuted his false claims in a web page
http://rangevoting.org/BlackSingle.html#condmyth
he at least consult that web page BEFORE making claims that
have already been disproved there.
I already gave examples in 1D where the Condor
At 06:17 AM 2/23/2007, Jan Kok wrote:
>2. Under IRV, if a "third party" candidate makes it to the last round,
>it draws little attention from the media. But under TTR, when there is
>a runoff, both candidates get equal attention for several weeks. This
>lets the finalists compete on an equal basis,
IRV completes its election on election day. We know the winner. While we
could and should know who was second, there is nothing to be done about
such. Voters do not have solid data as to other candidates.
TTR:
Can complete election in one day - but, even here, we should know
who was se
The web page listed some interesting factors that may have effect but
I think it didn't provide a complete plausible explanation to the two
party domination questions and the role of IRV and top-two runoff in
this.
> Why do those two methods, which seem strategically quite similar,
lead t
The statistical evidence at http://rangevoting.org/TTRvIRVstats.html
seems pretty good that IRV leads to two party domination in IRV
elections, while (delayed) top two runoff tends to lead to a strong
multiparty system.
Why do those two methods, which seem strategically quite similar, lead
to such
16 matches
Mail list logo
