Re: [EM] UncAAO

Dear Forest, you wrote: > So practically speaking, elimination of Pareto dominated alternatives > is extremely unlikely to have any effect, although UncAAO technically > fails the criterion. I believe so, too... > Note that if approval is measured in relation to a virtual "approval > cutoff cand

[EM] UncAAO

IEVS 3.22 now implements Forest Simmons' latest UncAAO voting method [Uncovered, Approval, Approval Opposition] Warren D Smith http://rangevoting.org http://rangevoting.org/IEVS/IEVS.c election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] UncAAO

Forest wrote ... > >Is TACC monotone? It seems to me that the winner W could improve in >approval enough to overtake and surpass some W' in approval without >defeating W' pairwise, though W' covers W. I see: then W wouldn't have been the original winner. election-methods mailing list - s

Re: [EM] UncAAO

Jobst, You've probably already figured this out, but here goes: UncAAO fails IDPA to the same extent that Approval does, because it is possible (however unlikely) for a Pareto Dominated alternative to get as much or more approval than an alternative that dominates it. But note that if Y' Pare

Re: [EM] When and how can we speak of "individual utility" and "social utility"?

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes: > At 05:28 PM 2/28/2007, Michael Poole wrote: > >>I suggest you re-read what I wrote. This rambling has nothing to do >>with what I wrote. > > I'm glad. Which is not at all an incentive to reread what Mr. Poole > wrote I did not intend what I wrote to be a comment

Re: [EM] RE : Re: When and how can we speak of "individual utility" and "social utility"?

At 07:11 PM 2/28/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: >--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > While it is already true that Range and Approval *do* > > satisfy that Criterion, in my opinion, on the argument that the > > majority has consented to a different outcome, > >"Majority criterion"

Re: [EM] When and how can we speak of "individual utility" and "social utility"?

At 05:28 PM 2/28/2007, Michael Poole wrote: >I suggest you re-read what I wrote. This rambling has nothing to do >with what I wrote. I'm glad. Which is not at all an incentive to reread what Mr. Poole wrote I did not intend what I wrote to be a commentary on his writing, but simply to be w

Re: [EM] UncAAO

Dear Forest, you proposed UncAAO: > UncAAO stands for Uncovered, Approval, Approval Opposition. Here's > how it works: > > For each candidate X, > > if X is uncovered, > > then let f(X)=X, > > else let f(X) be the candidate against which X has the least approval > opposition, among those candidat

[EM] Ehiquette

There is value to discussing conflicting ideas while avoiding personally negative rhetoric. Doing so improves the quality of the discussion for everyone. I only mention this on the chance it might make a difference. I'm not particularly wanting formal procedures for filtering by the group. I'm

[EM] typo

I said: The least fortunate voter either rates 1 candidate 1 and N-1 candidates 0, or rates N candidates 1 and rates N-1 candidatres 0. I meant to say: The least fortunate voter either rates 1 candidate 1 and N-1 candidates 0, or rates N-1 candidates 1 and rates 1 candidate 0. Mike Ossipoff

[EM] Plurality has 4 times the inequality of voting power

I’ve told why Approval doesn’t give more voting power to people who mark more candidates. But what if we define a “voting power” that can vary between voters? What quantity would make sense as that voting power? How about the voter’s opportunity to increase his/her expectation in the electio

[EM] Set-Voting

I’m not saying that you didn’t already know this: Approval can be regarded as a generalization of 1-vote Plurality as follows: Plurality lets you vote a set of one candidate better than the candidates not in that set. Approval generalizes that by letting you vote any set better than the candi

[EM] Approaches to proposing Approval

I was saying before that the worst thing you can do is introduce people to Approval by telling them that they can vote for as many candidates as they want to. That’s perceived as illegal Plurality and as a violation of our right to 1-person-1-vote (1p1v). But how about this: Start by descri

Re: [EM] When and how can we speak of "individual utility" and "social utility"?

Lomax says: But we should not let this distract us from the fact that utility analysis is really the *only* approach to judging how well election methods perform, it is not like we have other methods competing with it. Election criteria might be considered such methods, but they are clearly in