On Mar 20, 2007, at 7:02 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> The point I make again and again is that it is actually only a very
> small step beyond trusting a candidate for an office and trusting
> the candidate to elect someone to the office.
Yes, in some settings the difference may not be drama
At 03:32 PM 3/18/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>Abd has good ideas under the labels Assets and Delegable Proxy, but they
>are buried in so many books of words that extracting useful value is
>difficult.
Hey, there is a quick solution: don't understand something, ask.
Better, ask on the wiki. The FAQ
At 10:45 AM 3/18/2007, Chris Benham wrote:
>>Chris has made some assumptions about the identity of candidates. In
>>particular, I've assumed that write-in votes are allowed. So what is
>>to prevent a voter from voting for himself or herself?
>As I understand the Asset Voting procedure, if a signif
At 03:20 AM 3/17/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>Offer me true Approval - the one that differs from Plurality only in
>permitting over votes - and we have something understandable and,
>occasionally, useful.
This is true Approval. What else would it be?
(Ballot design may vary, but the essence is th
At 06:16 PM 3/17/2007, Juho wrote:
One could also say that Asset voting is not free of the need for
>strategic considerations but that the strategic considerations get so
>complex that the the votes could as well forget them.
Actually, I wouldn't agree. What happens is that "strategic"
considerat
Mike,
--- Michael Ossipoff <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> My criteria describe some ways that a method can limit strategy need.
The effects of your criteria aren't really being considered. You and I
use almost the same criteria, just under different schemes.
> What
> reason is there to believe
Announcing OpenSTV version 1.1 -- software for computing the single
transferable vote, instant runoff voting, and many other voting
systems. More details and download links are at
http://stv.sourceforge.net.
This release includes three new methods:
(1) Scottish STV -- Rules that will be used in S
Ballots are range with finite number of range choices.
Think of the cutoff between each range value as a virtual candidate.
List all of the candidates, virtual or not, in order of median range
value.
While any candidate pairwise beats its immediate superior, swap the
highest such pair in the l
If we include the approval cutoff "App" as a virtual candidate in DMC,
and elect the second place winner when App is the DMC winner, then
(since DMC is immune from second place complaints) the resulting method
can be described as follows without any mention of App:
List the candidates in order
Chris, this reminds me of something related I suggested last December in
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2006-December/019070.html
under the title of
"[EM] carrying Warren's approval equilibrium idea to its logical
conclusion"
Here's an extract:
"... Amo
Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Your definition of your criteria system sounds conversational and
inexact. Could you demonstrate why Approval and 0-10 CR fail
Condorcet's Criterion, in your system?
Aside from that, why is it ok to speak of intent, but not preference?
Speaking of preference is an
Id said [regarding the fictitious-ranking criteria system]:
I've already answered about that. It's based on a privileged balloting
system. My criteria make no mention of any balloting system.
Kevin replies:
But you also can't demonstrate that they are unambiguous for any possible
election
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Aside from that, why is it ok to speak of intent, but not preference?
Intent is post-strategy. Here's an example of the process:
1. Say my "sincere preferences" are A>B>C>D>E.
2. Then I apply whatever reasoning and decide that I will be voting D>A>B
and truncate the
Mike,
--- Michael Ossipoff <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> >I share the Venke (similar to Woodall's) approach that the criteria
> >should assume that the voters intend to submit a ranked ballot (maybe
> >truncated, maybe with some equal-ranking) and that voters
> >fill out their actual (maybe res
I'd said:
Obviously majority rule is violated by an outcome that is contrary to what
a majority have voted that they want. For instance, if a majority vote B
over A, then we can assume that, if A or B wins, they vote that it be B.
Chris says:
That is reasonable, and granted for the sake of a
I'd said:
Obviously majority rule is violated by an outcome that is contrary to what
a majority have voted that they want. For instance, if a majority vote B
over A, then we can assume that, if A or B wins, they vote that it be B.
Chris says:
That is reasonable, and granted for the sake of
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