Re: [EM] JS Mill's _Representative Government_, chapter 7

At 06:04 PM 7/18/2007, Steve Barney wrote: >I am reading John Stuart Mill's great classic book, _Representative >Government_. Chapter 7 is all about the representation of minority >views, and much of that is about Hare's proportional STV method. To >see where he is coming from, it would be a good i

[EM] WS: Blue wins in your example

WS: You said that Hitler wins in your example of order-reversal and truncation. Would that it were so. Actually Blue wins instead of Hitler :=( Blue is the only candidate with no pairwise defeats. Condorcet doesn't look at pairwise opposition unless it's in a defeat. It would be better for Hi

Re: [EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 37, Issue 14

At 01:30 PM 7/18/2007, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >About DYN, Condorcet then range, and range then top-two runoff: I'm concerned >about using a complicated method for three reasons. First of all, Approval is an excellent method, and minimally complicated, it's actually a little less complex in some

[EM] JS Mill's _Representative Government_, chapter 7

I am reading John Stuart Mill's great classic book, _Representative Government_. Chapter 7 is all about the representation of minority views, and much of that is about Hare's proportional STV method. To see where he is coming from, it would be a good idea to read the previous chapter, too. In case

Re: [EM] To ws, re: Condorcet vs Approval

At 09:08 AM 7/18/2007, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >As I've been saying here, in a series of elections in which voters >base their strategy on previous results, Approval quickly homes in >on the voter median candidate, the CW, and stays there. > >I certainly don't disagree about the great merit of Ap

Re: [EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 37, Issue 14

About DYN, Condorcet then range, and range then top-two runoff: I'm concerned about using a complicated method for three reasons. 1) Complicated methods have a lot of design decisions. Voters will be unhappy if their candidate lost, but would have won if a design decision were done differently. 2)

[EM] To ws, re: Condorcet vs Approval

ws wrote: We show that approval voting strategic equilibria are closely related to honest Condorcet Winners. There exists an approval equilibrium with a clear font-runner F and runner-up R if and only if the F is the clear Condorcet Winner and R the Condorcet runner-up. In contrast, we show t

Re: [EM] When Voters Strategize, Approval Voting Elects Condorcet

One more thought on the trend to reduce the level of strategic games with the votes. It may be possible to develop also automatic strategies for the votes. If there is a need to guarantee the termination of the strategy changes one could artificially force that by e.g. allowing the strategy