Re: [EM] Why my methods are unbiased by accepted definition

Warren Smith wrote: Mike Ossipoff in the thus-named post failed to provide any definition or any theorem as usual, while also failing to answer my question about Hamilton's method. Concerning further issues related to Apportionment: 1. Ossipoff's "bias free" method can be cast in a global optim

[EM] Historical apportionment biases

I finally got around to computing them. The attached spreadsheet contains the Spearman biases of the apportionments using the historical House sizes and apportionment populations. I plan on adding some non-divisor methods later. Year,Jefferson,Webster,Ossipoff,Hill,Dean,Adams 1790,0.625,0.085

[EM] Apportionment bias simulation

This was performed in response to Mike's argument that Hill's apportionment method is more biased than Webster's. (As you will see, he's right.) In my simulation, I assumed: * There are 50 states and 435 seats. * Each state is guaranteed one seat. That is, a state with population p is given

Re: [EM] Would would you say about a method that gives a seat to a 1-person state?

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > The examples dramatize Hill's bias, but would could be more dramatic than > > this?: > > > > If we dildn't have the 1-free-seat-for-each-state rule, Hill would give > > everyone a seat anyway, but Hill's own rules. It would give a

Re: [EM] Hamilton beats Hll in the example. Hill shows the most bias of the 3 methods.

MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: > > For instance, someone recently posted that Webster and Hill gave the > same allocation for 2000. But, in the censuses where they differ, how > does their bias compare? And if anyone is going to do such comparisons, > I'd suggest testing Bias-Free along with Hamilton, Hi

Re: [EM] Hamilton beats Hll in the example. Hill shows the most bias of the 3 methods.

MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: > > After testing Hill and Bias-Free in the 10-state example, it occurred to > me to also test Hamilton. Hamilton's allocation was about 2.8 times less > biased than that of Hill. Bias-Free had tested more than 3 times less > biased than Hill. > > I'd said that Bias-Free a

Re: [EM] Hamilton vs Webster (Sainte-Lague)

MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: ... > Are there other reasons > why LR/Hamilton is not favoured? > > I reply: > > That's reason enough. Two kinds of nonmonotonicity: Population > nonmonotonicity and House-size nonmonotonicitly. Your state can lose a seat > because of a population change favoring your stat

Re: [EM] Joe: Bias

Joseph Malkevitch wrote: > > How do YOU measure bias [of an apportionment method]? > > Can you provide the data for bias based on your definition of small > state and bias? Although I'm not the one who was asked, I'll propose a method of measuring the bias of an apportionment method: Compute t

Re: [EM] Competitive Districting Rule

James Gilmour wrote: > Juho Sent: Friday, July 14, 2006 10:22 PM ... >> Note that subdivision of parties and their alliances and >> whatever other groupings add tools to the voter to express >> what she wants. Also models where STV like ordering is not >> used but the vote to James automatically

Re: [EM] IRV vs Condorcet - a challenge

Dave Ketchum wrote: > Permitting equal ranking for multiple candidates. Desirable for > pleasing those who call Approval desirable; doable with Condorcet, though > there can be arguments as to counting' Not doable as practical for IRV > (explain how if you disagree). Some simple ways of

[EM] New method: Single-Member Virtual District Condorcet by Candidate Correlation (SMVDCCC) (was: BTR-STV)

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > Yes, each of four seats would, ideally, represent 25% of the > population, if the assembly is to be a peer assembly, with each > member equitably having the same voting power. However, this is the > very problem we are trying to solve. If might seem that if could >

Re: [EM] STV-CLE

James Green-Armytage wrote: > Dan, > > The CLE-STV idea is not consistent with the basic spirit of proportional > representation. > A simple example: > > 3 seats to be filled, 100 voters, Newland-Britton quota is 25. > 50: A>B>C>D>E > 16: C>E>D>A>B > 14: D>E>C>A>B > 20: E>C>D>A>B > >

Re: [EM] STV-CLE

Brian Wichmann wrote: Dear Dan, I have been sent details of the STV-CLE which I found quite interesting. Certainly not strict STV, but uses preferential votes rather well. Your implementation seems relatively easy to integrate with Jeff O'Neill pSTV. If this were done, then it should be

[EM] STV-CLE

I've made passing mention of my STV-CLE method (the CLE stands for Condorcet Loser Elimination) a couple of times, but the recent "Proportional Condorcet Voting" thread encouraged me to finally give it a decent introduction. Essentially, STV-CLE is just like STV, except that instead of elimin

Re: [EM] Proportional Condorcet Voting

Antonio Oneala wrote: > All of the proportional condorcet methods I've heard of so far rely on > STV to some extent. PSC-CLE doesn't rely on STV. However, the simplicity comes at a price: 80: A>B>C>D>E>F 40: D>E>F>A>B>C Winners of a 3-seat election are A, B, D. 10: X1>A>B>C>D>E>F 10: X2>A>B>C

Re: [EM] Amnon Rubinstein's Proposal for Electoral Reform in Israel

Doreen Dotan wrote: > */[EMAIL PROTECTED] > /* > > Antonio jwrote: > > >STV was a half-hearted attempt to fix a broken system, SNTV. > > In learning a bit about SNTV I came across this curious factoid: "The > New Party

Re: [EM] Voting by selecting a published ordering (was sidetracked to EC)

Simmons, Forest wrote: > Steve E. wrote ... > > Now... can we please go back to discussing whether candidates would have > sufficiently > strong incentives to rank compromise candidates over worse candidates, when > publishing > their orderings before election day, assuming the voting method I r

[EM] New multi-seat method: Transferable Cumulative Vote with Approval Loser Elimination (TCVALE)

Antonio Oneala has recently spoken in favor of Proportional Approval Voting (PAV). Unfortunately, adoption of PAV is likely to be hindered by the computational complexity of the "list all the possible outcomes" step. Which led me to ask, "How can we achieve proportional representation with ap

Re: [EM] Electoral College (was Re: Voting by selecting a published ordering)

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: ... > Personally, though, I would do something entirely different. I would > suggest that electors run for office. Personally. I would take the > Presidential candidates off the ballot entirely. I would use the > College much more closely to how it was originally inten

Re: [EM] Amnon Rubinstein's Proposal for Electoral Reform in Israel

Antonio Oneala wrote: > > */James Gilmour <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>/* wrote: > > > Antonio Oneala> Sent: Tuesday, April 25, 2006 12:08 AM > > > I've never really been a fan of STV-PR. It's still a system > > that's not independent of irrelevant alternatives, so in most > > states i

Re: [EM] Voting by selecting a published ordering

Simmons, Forest wrote: > Dan Bishop wrote ... > > "How about making it less stealthy by including the candidates' > orderings? A row of the ballot would look something like this: > > [ ] HOWARD DEAN (Democratic Party) > Bob Graham, John Kerry, John Edw

Re: [EM] Voting by selecting a published ordering

Anthony Duff wrote: > --- "Simmons, Forest" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >>Note that Eppley's suggestion (in its simplest forms) requires only a standard >>plurality style ballot, and each voter marks only one alternative (a >>candidate's >>name or a code word for somebody else's published orderi

Re: [EM] Electing a proportional executive/cabinet

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Is there any standard/efficient way to elect a cabinet directly ? > > The only example I know of is the N. Ireland one. Under that system, > the d'hondt system is used. The largest party gets first choice and so > on based on the d'hondt system. This isn't really di

Re: [EM] Correlated Instant Borda Runoff, without Borda

Ken Kuhlman wrote: > PS: I had a conjecture that the pairwise matrix & independence matrix > combined contained enough information to re-construct the original > ballots (assuming fully ranked ballots).Would anyone be interested > in evaluating it? I could easily be embarrassingly wrong again

[EM] Correlated Instant Borda Runoff, without Borda

Months ago, someone proposed a method called "Correlated Instant Borda Runoff (CIBR)" in order to fix Borda's clone problem. But only now has it occurred to be that CIBR's clone-purging idea might be good for things other than improving on Borda. I've got a couple of examples below, but first I

Re: [EM] question re: converting ballots into a matrix

rob brown wrote: > On 12/5/05, *Dan Bishop* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote: > > If Margins is used as the measure of defeat strength, then an A=B ballot > is equivalent to the combination ½ A>B + ½ B>A, as they both have zero >

Re: [EM] question re: converting ballots into a matrix

rob brown wrote: > On 12/5/05, *Kevin Venzke* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > wrote: > > > Has anyone ever considered also adding one-half a "point" to each > of the > > equals? > > Yes. It's equivalent to using margins. > > Not sure I understand what you mean

Re: [EM] I think Bishop's deconstruction algorithm fails

Warren Smith wrote: >... > Well, one reply to that is "duh." Another reply is, there are matrices > which do not arise from ballots. It is an interesting question which > matrices are achievable and which are not. > > Bishop's algoorithm if it works (which I doubt) would answer that question. >

Re: [EM] Condorcet Matrix Decomposition

Rob Brown wrote: > Why do you need to break ties? Wouldn't it make more sense to consider ties > to > be ranked equally? Perhaps you're trying to approximate an election method that requires fully-ranked ballots, in which case it makes sense to avoid ties whenever possible. More importantly,

[EM] Condorcet Matrix Decomposition

For any set of ranked ballots, there is a unique Condorcet matrix. If there are 3 or more candidates, the converse is not true (e.g., consider A>B>C+C>B>A and B>A>C+C>A>B). But even though we can't find the exact set of ballots that created a Condorcet matrix, we can find *a* set of ballots (w