for competitive elections (where we want
all voters to cast votes of similar strength). If someone has as
exact and compact formulations (to fix this one or to propose a new
one) on where and how Range works please put them forward.
Juho
= leader is c
35 ab,cd
33 bc,ad
32 dc,ab
= leader is b
35 ab,cd
33 bc,ad
32 dca,b
= leader is b
= winner is b
Juho
On Jul 18, 2007, at 1:59 , Forest W Simmons wrote:
Mr. Schudy's article reinforces the rationale behind DYN: that with
reliable partial information, Approval does as well or better
examples
where some large scale public elections where voters make independent
decisions on how to vote would tend to fail.
Juho
On Jul 16, 2007, at 7:32 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I've written a short paper that I think you may find interesting.
It's still
somewhat drafty, but it's good
the voters to cast ranked votes and donate
the whole vote to one candidate that would then be allowed to put the
approval cutoff in those votes in the most appropriate position.
Juho
On Jul 12, 2007, at 21:22 , Forest W Simmons wrote:
In further response to Juho's question about candidates making
before the election?
If the votes are counted after, will each proxy know the number of
delegated votes that other proxies have (or the number of his/her own
delegated votes) before they cast their proxy votes?
Juho
On Jul 10, 2007, at 2:21 , Forest W Simmons wrote:
Delegable Yes/No:
Each
://www.geocities.com/stepjak/index.htm
Juho
On Jun 28, 2007, at 2:28 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
I looked on the original images with extreme interest, as well as the
images that Warren produced, and I was just wondering if anyone had
produced images showing any differences in Condorcet
method?
Juho
Thanks!
Michael Rouse
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list info
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list info
On May 18, 2007, at 6:45 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:32 AM 5/17/2007, Juho wrote:
What would be the most likely scenario where the coerced person
could
not avoid being coerced? I'm assuming that a typical coercer would
not be a member in the team that counts the votes and he/she
On May 17, 2007, at 7:07 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 09:07 PM 5/16/2007, Juho wrote:
On May 16, 2007, at 18:26 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Yes, there are ways to *reduce* the possibility of a coercer
verifying that the victim complied. None are guaranteed to work.
What would
On May 16, 2007, at 18:26 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 03:32 PM 5/15/2007, Juho wrote:
I think some very basic methods eliminate the possibility of coercion
quite well (e.g. ballots with only few options, no write-ins, marked
ballots rejected, voting only manually, at places well controlled
like replace some ballots with new ones.
a coercer, under present law, can already arrange to view ballots
directly.
I guess this refers to the U.S law. This of course (in addition to
providing some openness) introduces also some privacy and coercion
related problems.
Juho
On May 14, 2007, at 13:26 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Juho wrote:
(2) Direct democracy generally requires open voting. Coercion
seems
to be rare;
Open voting opens a door to coercion. A violent husband of might
easily tell his wife how to vote. Open votes also are likely to lead
, it becomes easier to corrupt.
These words seem to indicate that in direct democracy we would need
to seek some balance between privacy and risk of corruption.
Juho
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(no core support
there???). These arguments are country and use case specific and do
not say much about which methods are good in general or in all/
typical/most environments.
Range *also* allows the majority to rule.
Ok, if the voters go use the Approval strategies.
Juho
to make the case easy to explain, that is maybe not a
catastrophic move. :-)
Juho
On Apr 25, 2007, at 3:32 , Tim Hull wrote:
I know the Condorcet winner is preferred to every other candidate -
however, I'm in particular assuming ballots like this:
48% - 10 D 2 PW 0 R
47% - 10 R 2 PW 0 D
5
(or why not proxies) seem acceptable to them.
Juho
On Apr 25, 2007, at 6:44 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 03:56 PM 4/24/2007, Juho wrote:
On Apr 24, 2007, at 1:51 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
4) The ultimate form of democracy is one that
* maximizes voter knowledge of issues
* seeks
On Apr 25, 2007, at 7:48 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:41 PM 4/24/2007, Juho wrote:
The reason why I talked about learning is that Range is often
described so that the first impression voters will get is that they
should put their sincere ratings on the ballot (and they would
and/or ability to provide opinions in
more than one dimension (traditionally often the left-right axis)
would probably reduce the nose plugging effect.
Juho
P.S. One more comment on the older mails. The number of voters has an
effect in the sense that the higher the number of voters
-winner Approval based methods (e.g. http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proportional_approval_voting).
Juho
On Apr 24, 2007, at 1:50 , Gervase Lam wrote:
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2007 14:28:56 -0400
From: Howard Swerdfeger
Subject: Re: [EM] PR in student government
Voting Instructions:
1. You only have
small things don't force voters to push their viewpoints through.
Juho
On Apr 24, 2007, at 6:01 , Michael Poole wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes:
At 05:53 PM 4/23/2007, Juho wrote:
Political elections are typically competitive. Polls are typically
less competitive. Voting on which family
On Apr 24, 2007, at 6:48 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:37 PM 4/23/2007, Juho wrote:
Another explanation to the emergence of Approval style strategic
voting is that an individual voter might learn that, in a case where
there are only two candidates that have chances of winning
party, is a
candidate that majority of voters would prefer in comparison to any
other candidate. I'd say that is strong support, although the number
of first place rankings in the ballots may not be as high as with
some other candidates.
Juho
Also, dominance by two major parties would
in the society, and (maybe most importantly) the level of
competitiveness in the elections in question.
Juho
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are typically
less competitive. Voting on which family size Pizza (of several good
ones) to buy for the family today may well be a quite non-competitive
election.
Juho
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On Apr 23, 2007, at 22:34 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:14 PM 4/23/2007, Juho wrote:
Let's say that in the U.S. presidential elections roughly 48% of the
voters vote D=9, R=7, PW=1 and roughly 48% vote R=9, D=7, PW=1.
Either D or R wins.
The premise is utterly insane and, quite simply
winner methods (in
competitive environments). In almost all set-ups Condorcet is likely
to be quite problem free.
Juho
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alternative paths forward. Ones where current rules are not modified
or are just improved in small scale, one could touch the rules of
funding, increasing the number of parties etc.
Juho
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my comment that Condorcet should probably be among the
candidates to consider. It allows voters to give quite a lot of
information (ranking) and is still almost never vulnerable to attacks.
Juho
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the voters, and it may be better not even try to use that
information in the calculation process than to try and fail.)
Juho
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. by making the group structure more detailed).
Juho
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election-methods mailing
Some delayed comments on MultiGroup.
On Apr 8, 2007, at 7:20 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:01 AM 4/7/2007, Juho wrote:
it is an imposed system that the party names are on the ballot at
all
That could also be called information
It is one particular kind of information, one which
discussion points above
do not indicate any clear reasons for the citizens in general to
support the state level winner take all practice.
Juho
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depend of what they
want to achieve. Elected food for lunch should be such that all group
members can eat it, but electing a recreational activity for the same
group could be allowed to optimize the outcome for a small group of
people (the others will have their lucky day some other day).
Juho
that Juho is designing now, that's a top-down, imposed system. I
mean that it is not created from the bottom, contrasted with how
Asset creates seats or delegable proxy selects top-level proxies.
One idea behind MultiGoup is to soften the monolithic party model by
allowing them to show different
although I
didn't yet verify all of this by programming it (which often reveals
some gaps in thoughts). Any feedback on potential weaknesses will be
appreciated.
Juho
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Juho
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On Apr 7, 2007, at 0:34 , James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Sent: 06 April 2007 22:25
Also, to give more power directly to the voters, while maintaining an
easy way to vote, easy understanding of what the candidates stand
for, and with accountability.
If that is what you want, why not just use STV
limitations too).
I'm somewhat familiar with the history of the discussions on
this ,ailing list so I know what kind of methods these discussions
usually refer to. Just checking if there is a clear definition of the
target state where the most promising methods might take us.
Juho
On Mar 24, 2007, at 6:28 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 01:31 PM 3/23/2007, Juho wrote:
Are you saying that FAs would not succumb to the old hazards?
Yes.
I think
it is probable that many FAs would drift towards more formal
structures, strict leadership and rules (especially
work so well that it would
automatically lead us to a better future. There are many risks, like
getting infiltrated with the old politicians as soon as it gets
some power. Maybe there will be trials and fine-tuning of the theory.
Juho
, and if their attitude
towards their fellow contributors is appropriate. :-)
Juho
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ways needed to
avoid and fix such phenomena to grow too strong.
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proposal.)
Juho
On Mar 18, 2007, at 10:59 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
Abd has good ideas under the labels Assets and Delegable Proxy, but
they are buried in so many books of words that extracting useful
value is difficult.
Here Juho offers a useful framework to build on, so I will try some
as if it it was a single candidate. The method is of
course also Condorcet compliant if the subgroups are seen as single
candidates.
Juho
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On Mar 15, 2007, at 17:18 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 01:45 AM 3/15/2007, Juho wrote:
I see candidate withdrawal related problems to be quite different
from what I see in the proposed three based method. The biggest
problem I see in candidate withdrawal is that if the person/group
perspective.
The alliance was quite natural. And it led to elimination of a risk
of strategic voting.
So, at least in some cases tree based Condorcet methods seem to bring
happiness to the world :-).
Juho
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that are closely linked to the plurality
criterion.)
Juho
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On Mar 14, 2007, at 12:15 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Doubtless this won't thread correctly.
Juho said
Some observations.
The description talks only about the yes votes. Is the assumption
that the no votes mean no action will be taken?
If we are talking about approving a new law
if there was a tendency to
propose a new election with similar content right after the previous
one led to a don't try again conclusion. (This is getting a bit
complex = maybe recommendations and good practices and/or chairman's
discretion would be enough :-).)
Juho
as a result of widespread Approval style voting.
Juho
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complexity, but if justified for some reason, then why not. I'll try
to think more and come back if needed.
Juho
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On Mar 13, 2007, at 21:20 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 03:00 AM 3/13/2007, Juho wrote:
I guess you, as a Range expert, pretty well know what the anticipated
problematic scenarios are. Problems may arise e.g. when opinion polls
tell that Democrats would get only 49% of the votes (against 51
but probably the rules
need to be defined (to avoid e.g. 10 votes in one minute).
Juho Laatu
On Mar 14, 2007, at 1:13 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
There is a conflict that exists between some people when counting a
simple yes|No ballot. Some would say that a simple majority is all
that
is needed
may have different targets in your
mind but for me this was the easiest interpretation.
Juho
P.S. One example.
1: AB
1: C
Here B could be an Approval winner (tie) but not a max average rating
winner in the ranking maintaining style that was discussed above
(since the rating of B must
with sincere votes. It however
has the potential to lead to disasters if used in a mixed way so that
some voter groups mark their sincere preferences while some others
mark strategically only largest and smallest values.
Juho Laatu
It is hard to
imagine that more than 50% of the voters would
this. Random ballot and D2MAC (and their different
utility targets) may well be good methods for some other elections.
Juho
Yours, Jobst
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
list info
set-up is seen as part of the method) although the
ballots calculation process is not (when candidate set-up is seen as
an external input to this process).
Juho
On Mar 11, 2007, at 22:50 , Juho wrote:
Here's one more election method for you to consider. I often
represent the view
Electronic voting in Estonia, in case you haven't read about this yet.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonian_parliamentary_election%2C_2007
Juho
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with the recommended way of voting)
- multiple sincere votes may exist when there are alternative equally
good strategies
Sorry about not giving exact new definitions, but maybe you want to
do that yourself :-).
Juho
, Juho
P.S. I read your definition as intended - don't know if this had
something to do with the discussed topic above - reading word also
very literally etc.
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On Mar 6, 2007, at 8:56 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 04:50 PM 3/5/2007, Juho wrote:
On Mar 5, 2007, at 7:02 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
How, indeed, it occurs to me to ask, are we to know who got their
way in a secret ballot system? The presumption might be that the
way was gotten
A
as the first preference is greater than the number of voters ranking
another candidate B higher than last preference, then B must not be
elected.
Juho
On Mar 5, 2007, at 19:49 , Chris Benham wrote:
Michael Ossipoff wrote:
In a posting to a different mailing list, Markus pointed out
at maximising utility but at minimising
the number of voters that are unhappy (=never mind how unhappy they
are) with the selection. (Condorcet typically compares only one
pairwise decision at a time, which may be considered a weakness, but
I leave that discussion to another time.)
Juho
the right as a
general rule.
Juho
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different for different elections.
Juho
The method D2MAC aims to improve upon this. It is: Draw two ballots at
random; the winner is the most approved option of those approved on
both ballots, if such an option exists, or else the top option on the
first ballot.
Yours, Jobst
situations in
which the only Nash equilibria, the only stable outcomes, are ones
in which people order-reverse. Do you realize how far you’re going
in order to forgive that big fault of margins?
I'm not yet convinced tat stable strategic states would be the only
reasonable way forward.
Juho
recommendations on how to apply the
most efficient strategies
2) In some other countries recommending strategic voting would be
seen as an attempt of fraud and voters would immediately change their
opinion of that candidate
Juho says:
My learning is that it would be good to always state one's
On Feb 26, 2007, at 3:42 , Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho said (about margins poor properties with regard to unreversed
Nash equilibria):
This one did not change my feelings much. If you'd say something
similar about sincere votes
I reply:
Here I believe that you’re saying you want
the strategy is high.
Summary. At least with these numbers the two strategies don't seem to
work in practical large scale public elections. Winning votes seemed
less vulnerable to these attacks than margins but that property is
not needed unless the strategies are a real threat.
Juho
Mike
On Feb 24, 2007, at 13:31 , Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho--
You said:
Here's my example. It is in principle the same one I already used
but now presented as a bit more realistic scenario.
I reply:
Ok, if it’s effectively the same as your first example, then
doesn’t everything
On Feb 24, 2007, at 2:22 , James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Sent: 22 February 2007 06:29
On Feb 22, 2007, at 5:50 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
STAY AWAY from US Presidential elections. The Electoral College
offers too many complications to live with for this effort.
Ok, let it be UK then, electing a MP
. With a quick search I found the following mail
by Chris Benham that has further links to older mails.
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/
2005-June/016136.html
Juho
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(and centrists) would
still have an advantage (when compared to fully proportional multi-
winner methods).
Juho
On Feb 23, 2007, at 13:17 , Jan Kok wrote:
The statistical evidence at http://rangevoting.org/TTRvIRVstats.html
seems pretty good that IRV leads to two party domination in IRV
elections
On Feb 22, 2007, at 17:49 , Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho replies:
One thus needs to add one to the worst margins defeat of a
candidate to get the number of additional voters that the candidate
needs to become a Condorcet winner.
I reply:
So to find out what it would take to make
On Feb 21, 2007, at 12:53 , Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho replies:
Do you mean that margins would be so strategy inviting that most
voters would turn to strategic voters (in practical real-life
elections) if margins are used?
I reply:
Yes, voters would be more likely to regret sincere
). :-)
Juho
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or to the vote counter
Juho
On Feb 20, 2007, at 18:59 , Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Mike,
I guess a wiki would be the best way to do the poll then... The votes
could be posted in a single place, changed at will, and discussed
on a
talk page.
I reply:
...changed at will is the part that I don't
to popularize the method.
Juho
On Feb 20, 2007, at 14:11 , Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Dave Ketchum,
you wrote (20 Feb 2007):
Could there be a better name than minmax?
I recommend the name Simpson-Kramer.
Markus Schulze
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
On Feb 20, 2007, at 15:39 , Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho wrote:
My sympathies towards minmax(margins) come primarily from the way
it handles sincere votes.
I reply:
But there won’t be sincere votes for it to handle, to the extent
that it doesn’t allow sincere votes. That’s why
On Feb 19, 2007, at 10:42 , Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho wrote:
(There are good methods also on the other side of the fence,
like minmax(margins).)
I reply:
But, when saying that minmax(margins) is good, you've got to say
what it's good for. I've told what the wv methods are good
of the Smith set
In this categorization Chris Benham's set is A = winning votes, B =
yes. (There are good methods also on the other side of the fence,
like minmax(margins).)
Juho Laatu
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On Jan 9, 2007, at 2:25 , Simmons, Forest wrote:
Juho wrote:
How about the smallest number of ballots on which some
alternative that beats A pairwise is ranked higher than A?
Juho
If I am not mistaken, this idea is equivalent to electing the
alternative A with the greatest number
distorted the polling. We would also have to consider the
effects which could move the vote in the opposite direction.
Ok, I didn't pay too much attention to this yet. Let's see if someone
identifies some new properties.
Juho Laatu
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or the worst number of opposing
voters with well justified opinions (=someone would beat the
candidate also in pairwise comparison).
Juho Laatu
On Jan 13, 2007, at 14:46 , Juho wrote:
On Jan 9, 2007, at 2:25 , Simmons, Forest wrote:
Juho wrote:
How about the smallest number of ballots on which
there are numerous candidates expecting all voters to
know the candidates well enough to give them a STV like preference
order may be too much. In elections where all candidates are well
known that might be ok.
Juho Laatu
On Dec 21, 2006, at 14:34 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: [EMAIL
elections vs. contentious
elections among the members of this list :-) ).
Juho Laatu
On Jan 2, 2007, at 17:37 , Chris Benham wrote:
Juho wrote:
How about the smallest number of ballots on which some
alternative that beats A pairwise is ranked higher than A?
Juho
No, that would
How about the smallest number of ballots on which some alternative
that beats A pairwise is ranked higher than A?
Juho
On Dec 31, 2006, at 3:52 , Simmons, Forest wrote:
Here's a version that is both clone proof and monotonic:
The winner is the alternative A with the smallest number
On Dec 30, 2006, at 18:37 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
The particular vulnerability alleged here is actually applicable to
*all* election systems, it happens to be here stated in a specific
way that could make it appear that AV is more vulnerable than, say,
IRV or IRRV.
The interesting
in theory.
I don't claim that this strategy would somehow dramatically change
the way I see Approval. But it is good to cover also these
possibilities and prepare for them, and to make the voters and
politicians and media aware of these risks.
Juho Laatu
in developing a wording
that would be acceptable to all. (an optimist? :-)
Juho Laatu
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preference votes would do).
Using + and - a ballot might look e.g. a+bc=de-fg-h-i.
Just for your consideration. Different ballot styles may have an
impact on strategies too.
Juho Laatu
On Dec 15, 2006, at 15:02 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
How did we get here?
I assume no ties to simplify
On Dec 18, 2006, at 1:05 , Warren Smith wrote:
Juho Laatu:
Here's my quick characterization [of range voting]:
- RV is a wonderful method for dominantly non-competitive elections
and polls
- RV utility function is very good when compared to most alternative
methods
- RV is very vulnerable
intentionally
generated circular preferences every time.
Juho Laatu
DWK
On Sun, 17 Dec 2006 21:40:02 +0200 Juho wrote:
I thought mostly use scenarios where the favourite candidate is
not involved in the cycles and the voters know very little about
the anticipated results. Another example
to the audience if presented so, but it is another question if it is
bad or if it looks bad to mathematicians.
Juho Laatu
On Dec 14, 2006, at 6:16 , Dan Bishop wrote:
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
...
Are there other reasons
why LR/Hamilton is not favoured?
I reply:
That's reason enough. Two kinds
will be elected from that branch, then
that favourite candidate probably takes a leadership position within
that branch even if the rules would not mandate that.
Juho Laatu
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the building where these
representatives will work has a fixed number of physical seats =
fill those seats and allocate voting power according to that.
Juho Laatu
On Dec 11, 2006, at 0:43 , Warren Smith wrote:
Actually, I claim EVERY apportionment method so far discussed is
biased
to
describe why I find LR quite natural despite of its peculiarities.
And as you already noted, all the discussed methods are very
proportional. Some favour big parties a bit but otherwise I'd mostly
talk about unavoidable small rounding errors.
Juho Laatu
On Dec 9, 2006, at 22:35 , MIKE OSSIPOFF
proportionality.
Juho Laatu
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that one intentionally wants to favour large parties
I find methods like d'Hondt/Jefferson better than setting a hard
limit (e.g. 5%) that parties must reach to get their first candidate
through.
Juho Laatu
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