Steve Eppley wrote in part:
>>Warren Smith's
example, in which a voter has total knowledge of all other votes before
casting her own vote, is implausible in the elections we're interested
in reforming.<<
I might be mistaken, but when I was introduced to this group it was more
about studying m
or
comparing methods that have an ordered list as their result.
The results of my test for 2007 D-1 baseball are at
http://www.kislanko.com/tau_dist_pw_1.html
Paul Kislanko
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
This is the kind of post that adds nothing to the EM debate.
There's no "theorems about 'point runoff' systems" in the link that's all in
the post.
Go to the link, and try to find a "theorem"
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Warren Sm
Peter de Blanc wrote
>>
> Perhaps some artificial inteligence tool, like neural networks or genetic
> algorithms, or a combination of both, could be used to search SociallyBest
> (zero BR), or at least get near it. If such formula is found, it could be
> truly complex or iloggical, something lik
Forest W Simmons wrote:
>>re's the improved version of PG-MPO (for want of a better name):
Ballots are range style.
For each candidate X and each range level R, let A(X,R) be the number
of ballots on which X is rated at level R or above.<<
Here's the problem with that. If R is not an ordinal
Regarding:
"Approval satisfies Majority rule, but not the Majority Criterion as
interpreted."
A majority of us VOTERS do not agree with the statement, even those of us
who might or might not agree with the interpretation.
It fails the absolute criterion, and a few of us voters notice that. We DO
N
Sentences should have subjects and predicates.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Dave Ketchum
Sent: Sunday, August 20, 2006 9:08 PM
To: Jonathan Lundell
Cc: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theor
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> Sent: Tuesday, May 16, 2006 8:10 PM
> To: Antonio Oneala; election-methods@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] teams
>
> At 06:23 PM 5/16/2006, Antonio Oneala wrote:
> > Asset voting is a way to quickly aggregate the preference of
> > the teams, but it does have f
Obviously some academics have too much time on their hands, 'cause this is
nonsense.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Jobst Heitzig
> Sent: Sunday, May 14, 2006 5:47 PM
> To: Election Methods Mailing List
> Subject: [EM] using wel
> This has been false since at least 1989, when the Berne Convention
> Implementation Act of 1988 went into effect and granted automatic
> copyright protections on all copyrightable work as soon as that work
> is created.
>
> Most other signatories implemented that part of the Berne Convention
>
t
include such a notice, it is "Public Domain" by default.
So, this reply to the list is Copyrighted 2006 by Paul Kislanko. Any use,
misuse, or humorous satirization of this email is prohibited without
explicit consent of the author. (Who will give it freely if it involves
humoruus satir
>From a theoretical standpoint, this may look intractactable, but for any
finite N,K the problem is solvable in polynomial time in a manner that
depends only upon N, K, and the number of voters. From a practical
standpoint, the calculation is not difficult for up to N,K=293 by
demonstation (I do th
> Brian Olson wrote (in part): Thus an
> election to fill 20 seats or 40 seats, all from one ballot, might
> start to get onerous if there are 2-5 times as many
> candidates as seats.
Not sure what you mean. From the voters' perspective the complexity is just
# of candidates if the method r
No, that is another mischaracterization of the original suggestion.
The whole EM list idea is now not worth my trouble, since everybody seems to
misinterpret everything anybody says and nobody wants to have a common
lexicon.
Shheeesh.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Interpreting Condorcet arrays is usually simple enough to do without a
computer, but best left to a computer with the rules programmed in for
cycles, which can happen.
OK, I have a system with 293 alternatives and a few thousand voters. If you
think it is simple to cont the 4
> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>
> It seems to have been missed by Mr. Ketchum that the voting is for a
> candidate, and that each candidate provides only one list, in advance
> of the election. Hence he asked:
>
> >Starts out looking good but, how many lists might there be
> with half a
> >doze
> Looking much like Condorcet. From there we know that cycles
> can occur,
> needing more thought here.
Only in the case of ties with respect to the pluralities that chose the
rankings involved. I think with more thoughht we'll find that the
tiebreaking method here corresponds to a cycle-break
Eric Gorr wrote:
> Sent: Wednesday, March 01, 2006 3:05 PM
> To: election-methods@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] proxies and confidentiality
>
> Quoting Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > (this is what has happened in the US over
> > the last 8 ye
Paul Kislanko wrote
> This is the fundamental question with delegable-Proxy. In
> order to meet
> Jobst's requirements, there must be a nomination and election
> (by secret
> ballot) of proxy-holders.
>
> Here, at least, there's no question about conforming to any
> Jobst Heitzig wrote
> Dear Abd ul-Rahman!
>
> I wrote:
> >> ... no person X must know whether or not s/he is a proxy for some
> >> other person Y, and Y must not have a possibility of proving to X
> >> that X is Y's proxy.
> >> ... Is this possible without the use of
> >> advanced technolo
Jiri Räsänen asked:
>
> Hello everyone,
>
> I am new to this list. I am interested for possible ways to visualize
> the votes tallying and the results for Beatpath method.
>
> Previously I have done some campaigning for the use of STV and found
> out that once I could draw the graphical versio
> In the legislatures (parliaments) that I am familiar with, if
> members want to
> abstain from a formal vote count, they have to leave the chamber.
>
> In these formal vote counts (divisions), all those voting one
> way move to one side
> of the chamber, those coting the other way move to the
I remain amazed that my light-hearted reference to a 50 year old science
fiction short story has prompted so much traffic. At the risk of giving away
the whole story, the idea is that there's this computer that runs
everything, and it picks one person from all the people in the world,
constructs th
ence fiction).
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Abd ulRahman Lomax
> Sent: Saturday, December 24, 2005 2:38 PM
> To: election-methods@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Correlated Instant Borda Runoff, without Borda
>
Again, I'm just a po' li'l ol' voter here. But there was a
resonation with the "need to have accurate polling data".
Neither I nor any other voter in my precinct gives a hoot
or assigns any credibility to the "have to have something to publish so we'll
publish the results of a badly-conduct
ods@electorama.comSubject: Re:
[EM] Approval Voting elections don't always have an
equilibrium
On 12/24/05, Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Rob
Brown wrote: I'm a
little curious, since you seem to talk about multiple voters
"I'm a
little curious, since you seem to talk about multiple voters switching their
vote togethermaybe this really represents a situation where there are
multiple equilibriums, as opposed to no
equilibriums?"
On the surface, "multiple equilibria" is kind of an
oxymoron, but the notion
Awhile back Dave Gamble and I speculated off-list that the "best" election
method would have each candidate fill out an extensive questionaire, and
have each voter fill out the same questionaire. Then a computer program
would find the best correlation between voters' answers and candidates'
answers
Jobst already provided the correct answer, which is part of the mathematical
literature. No need to publish yours.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Warren Smith
> Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2005 7:02 PM
> To: election-methods
t: Re:
[EM] number of possible ranked ballots given N candidates
On 12/14/05, Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
I
think it is possible, though, to use the combination of pairwise
matrixand the counts-by-rank matrix together to retrieve the the
original ballotpref
ences.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Rob LeGrand
> Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2005 5:37 PM
> To: Election Methods Mailing List
> Subject: Re: [EM] number of possible ranked ballots given N candidates
>
> P
number of possible ranked ballots given N
candidates
On 12/14/05, Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Just a
thought for your endeavor. A way to save "more" information than the
pairwise matrix but less than saving counts of each ballot configuration is
t
results.
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of rob brownSent:
Wednesday, December 14, 2005 5:12 PMTo: Paul KislankoCc:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; Election Methods Mailing ListSubject: Re:
[EM] number of possible ranked ballots given N candidates
On 12/14/05, Paul Kislanko
Just a thought for your endeavor. A way to save "more"
information than the pairwise matrix but less than saving counts of each ballot
configuration is to save an NxN matrix with column headings being count of #1,
#2, ... #N ranks and rows being the Alternatives. Use the
rule:
If equals ar
James Gilmour: wrote
>
> Maybe there are 4 million possibilities with 10 candidates,
> but you won't have 4 million actual combinations unless you
> have many more voters than 4 million.
I was going to mention this as well. From a practical standpoint, one only
need record the "forms" of ballots
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Cc: Election Methods Mailing
ListSubject: Re: [EM] number of possible ranked ballots given N
candidates
On 12/14/05, Rob LeGrand <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
Paul
Kislanko wrote:> The number of full ranked ballots is just the number
of permutations
e: [EM] number of possible ranked ballots given N candidates
>
> Paul Kislanko wrote:
> > The number of full ranked ballots is just the number of
> permutations of
> > N alternatives = N!
> >
> > If equal ranknigs are allowed, it's N! + 2^N - 1
>
> I assume
working with ways of using actual ballot data vs. just the matrix? ;)
-rob
On 12/14/05, Paul
Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
The
number of full ranked ballots is just the number of permutations of N
alternatives = N!
If equal
ranknigs are allo
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Rob LeGrand
> Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2005 3:13 PM
> To: Election Methods Mailing List
> Subject: Re: [EM] number of possible ranked ballots given N candidates
>
The number of full ranked ballots is just the number of
permutations of N alternatives = N!
If equal ranknigs are allowed, it's N! + 2^N -
1
If truncation is allowed it is approximately N! *
e
And if both truncation AND equal rankings are allowed it's
approximately N! * e + 2^N - 1
> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>
> Let me put it this way. If we have a true democracy, the form of
> government and its institutions are a matter of the consent of the
> people.
Let me put it this way. Any time I see a discussion about how a voting
method works begin with a philosophical argum
/bucklincomps.html (I
call it bucklincomps because you can use the same matrix to figure Bucklin
or Approval results).
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Paul Kislanko
> Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2005 11:24 PM
> To: &#
I don't think Chris is right about this, unless the definitions for "total
votes for" and "total votes against" are defined in a way that isn't
included in his description.
If "total votes for" is the sum of votes in the row corresponding to the
alternative, and "total votes against" is the sum of
ect: Re: [EM] thoughts on the
pairwise matrix
On 12/2/05, Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
The
only thing I asked was for people who make logical or mathematicalclaims
to prove them.No one wants to bother, so I don't
care.
Paul, you made claims that
OK, I give up.
The only thing I asked was for people who make logical or mathematical
claims to prove them.
No one wants to bother, so I don't care.
There isn't a PaulK "method", there is a suggestion that descriptions and
proofs be axiomitized in such a way that claims can be explained
unambig
> Steve Eppley wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> [Rob Brown suggested I post his unintentionally private message
> to me and my reply. Here they are.]
>
> Rob wrote to me:
> On 12/1/05, Steve Eppley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > I agree with both of Rob's messages so far on this topic
> > except for o
Rob has pretty much hit the nail on the
head.
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of rob
brownSent: Wednesday, November 30, 2005 5:17 PMTo:
election-methods@electorama.comSubject: [EM] ignoring "strength of
opinion"
I was thinking about Paul K's
> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
> At 01:32 PM 11/29/2005, Paul Kislanko wrote:
> >I actually have no method. But "Condorcet ballots" is an
> ambiguous term as
> >used in the reply to me. I actualy suggested that there BE a
> well-defined CB
> >such that for each
> -Original Message-
> From: Andrew Myers [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Tuesday, November 29, 2005 2:11 PM
> To: Paul Kislanko
> Cc: election-methods@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] thoughts on the pairwise matrix
>
> On Mon, Nov 28, 2005 at 06:41:3
> -Original Message-
> From: Dave Ketchum [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Monday, November 28, 2005 10:33 PM
> To: Paul Kislanko
> Cc: 'rob brown'; election-methods@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] thoughts on the pairwise matrix
>
> This one see
> -Original Message-
> From: Dave Ketchum [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Monday, November 28, 2005 10:34 PM
> To: Paul Kislanko
> Cc: 'Rob Brown'; election-methods@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] thoughts on the pairwise matrix
>
> You are mixi
>
> I apologize if my comments came off as an attack. I am just
> trying to
> understand your complaint, and unfortunately I still don't. If you
> don't want to address the question, then from my point of view, your
> complaint doesn't make sense and I just have to consider it "proven"
> no
> Rob Brown:
>
> Paul Kislanko airmail.net> writes:
>
> > That's my reason to distrust them. What is "beuatiful" about
> > getting my vote wrong?
>
> You have not supported your argument that they "get your vote wrong".
> They
> Rob Brown wrote:
>
> Isn't the fact that Condorcet methods ignore ballot positions
> relative to
> the "whole field of alternatives" the whole beauty of what Condorcet
> methods do?
That's my reason to distrust them. What is "beuatiful" about getting my vote
wrong?
election-methods mai
I'll
try again to make clear what I mean by not being convinced that methods that use
the PM to count votes can accurately reflect voters'
preferences.
The
basic claim is that the pairwise matrix accurately reflects pairwise preferences
by the voters. I do not believe this claim, because
>What do you consider it?Processed data.
>what kind of information is lost when going from ballots to the
matrix?
The relative
positions on ballots compared to the whole field of alternatives. Alternative A
ranked first, and E ranked fifth is cancelled by an E ranked fourth and A ranked
f
Mr Smith obviously doesn't understand English any more than he does math.
Mis-quoting me and mis-charactizing my arguments is proof of that.
What I said, in plain English, is that since there are multiple
decompositions of a pairwise matrix that would lead to the same pairwise
matrix, it would be
It depends upon what you mean by "fail". There are many different ballot
configurations that result in the same pairwise-matrix, so there is not
likely to be a unique solution to the Diophantine equations involved in the
decomposition. Whether that is a problem or not is a matter of taste.
Bishop
Well, none of the examples that have referenced "sports tournaments" have
had any relevance to election methods.
The whole discussion about "condorcet matrix" related to ballot sets is what
Dr. Paulos refers to as "innumeracy" as a short form for "mathematical
illiteracy".
_
From: [EM
> Rob Brown wrote:
>
> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax lomaxdesign.com> writes:
> > Color (even gray scale) can instantly show the Condorcet
> winner in a
> > pairwise matrix. I'll use gray scale. When the candidate naming the
> > row wins, leave the background color of the cell white. When the
> > colum
"Condorcet lets voters rank the candidates, looks at ALL that the voters
say, and compares each pair of candidates. Doing all the counting is easy
enough by computer, but a strain by hand. When there are near ties they
can get called cycles and resolution takes thought."
Defend the statement
This is a more eloquent description of what I've always
been saying. Voters understand "list the candidates you like in order". Approval
makes us uneasy because "list any candidate that isn't one you don't like"
causes is to worry that which we do like better might get an advantage depeding
If I'm not getting too senile, somewhere I read that the definition of an
"election method" was a mapping of ranked ballots into an ordered list. That
would make "scoring" a Condorcet method a legitimate question.
I have a personal distrust of methods that "score" by looking at only the
contents o
Warren's definition makes no sense once we get into the definition of
incentive.
Y'all are making this too hard.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Warren Smith
> Sent: Saturday, November 19, 2005 5:17 PM
> To: election-methods@el
ay she said she
would when "campaining" for voters to select her as proxy. Hence, anyone
casting more than one vote (i.e., hers and all the proxies she holds) must
make her vote public.
> -Original Message-
> From: Scott Ritchie [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Wednesday, Nov
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Scott Ritchie
> Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2005 6:49 PM
> To: rob brown
> Cc: election-methods@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] simple question (I think)
>
> On Wed, 2005-11-16 at 16:27 -0800
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Scott Ritchie
> Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2005 6:01 PM
> To: Paul Kislanko
> Cc: election-methods@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] A quick, dirty,and somewhat obviou
"Candidates A, B and C all have 8 pairwise wins. D has 7.
Could D still be chosen as the winner by any "reasonable" method? "
Sure. D's 7 pairwise
wins could be by a large enough majority that the "extra" pairwise win that A,
B, and C have over the fringe candidate that beats D by 1 vote
I won't respond to all of the following, but what I have to say was prompted
by the message
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
> Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2005 2:33 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: election-m
I can categorically state that no one in my small town would vote for any
method that did include secret ballots.
Consider anonymoty an axiom for any method to be considered for US voters.
That there may be no theoretical argument for it is irrelevant. If it is not
a part of the method, nobody i
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax quoted:
At 12:01 AM 11/14/2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
>. Issue independence: Even when there are multiple issues on the same
>ballot, I should have the option of indicating separate proxies for
>separate issues, while still voting directly on other issues, if I choose.
T
Warren is quite correct about:
Re NP-hardness & polytime, all such results take
place in an asymptotic limit as some parameter or parameters describing
nput size tend to infinity. Say the input size is N bits; then
an algorithm is polytime if its runtime is http://electorama.com/em for list info
I'm not sure what you are saying here.
_
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Simmons,
Forest
Sent: Wednesday, November 09, 2005 4:31 PM
To: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] another lottery method
Ballots are ordinal with approval cutoffs (or some
> MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> I'll refer to the "1-person-1-vote" objection to Approval as "1p1v".
>
> 1p1v has been demolished on EM in so many ways that I don't
> claim that this
> message will cover all of them. But I'd like to mention a few of them.
>
> 1p1v advocates imply or say that the vote
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> RLPO2PA has a brief definition, but, for the public, it won't
> be perceived
> as a simple definition. They won't like recursion.
IRV could be described as recursive plurality, and folks have explained that
satisfactorily. Any recursive process that can be proven to termin
> MIKE OSSIPOFF writes in part...
> Subject: [EM] What SFC & SDSC mean for rank methods
>
> But they have a special meaning for rank methods. Critics of
> pairwise-count
> methods, including Condorcet, criticize these methods for the
> offensive
> strategies that are possible. Offensive orde
> 40 A=B>D
> 35 D>B
> 25 C>D
>
> Now candidate D wins, with 100 votes in the second round."
No. 40 A=B>D is still 40 votes for D no higher than third. So in the second
round D has 60 votes.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Chris
Mike wrote (see below for context):
"Sure, the A and B voters have to choose whether to help eachother or
compete
with eachother, and if one competes and one helps, then that faction is
being had. If they both compete, they both lose.
That's the co-operation/defection problem, as it occurs in vo
Mike Ossippoff wrote:
>
>
> Forest--
>
> You wrote:
>
> If you use a range style ballot, and just go down one slot
> per Bucklin move,
> then you could discard the majority defeated candidates. It
> might help
> mitigate the Clone Winner problem, too.
>
> I reply:
>
> But wouldn't that l
Mike is correct. Bucklin with equal rankings and truncation allowed is
equivalent to ratings and does not require the complication in voting and
counting that ratings introduces.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sen
Mike Ossippoff wrote: (see below for full text)
I reply:
I agree. Most any method is acceptable then, except for Borda, which in its
standard form, forces you to rank all the candidates.
This is not an accurate description of what Count de Borda wrote. In its
"standard form" Borda says "
See below
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Dave Ketchum
> Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2005 7:38 PM
> Do you have to go back and look at the ballots after deciding
> on value of
> R? Gets messy with many ballots such as for go
Warren's example for IRV provides an excellent description of why I prefer
ranked-ballots with equal-rankings and truncation allowed, and prompted
these comments.
Note that in the example forcing the last 3 voters to list all preferences
caused their LEAST favorite to win. This is a nice demonstra
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sent: Monday, October 17, 2005 8:04 PM
> To: election-methods@electorama.com
> Subject: [EM] Can ranking improve on Approval? MDDA strategy.
>
>
> For me, as an individual voter, i
And the DH3 chemical weapon is really nasty.
C'mon, folks. If it's worth an abbreviation or acronymn it's worth spelling
out.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Kevin Venzke
> Sent: Friday, October 14, 2005 11:49 PM
> To: election-
My main objection is the notion that voters want to support a particular
vote-counting method's requitement for gathering information from voters.
No, us voters don't care whether the method needs maximum information (make
me rank 6 candidates when I only even care about a best and worst and
consid
OK, one more time. I'm just a dumb voter and:
"Fact is, a lot of voters want to express
maximum information (natural human drive) and do not want to truncate
ballots."
is not defensible. I do NOT want to have to rank voters I want to lose.
Nobody in my precinct wants to even think about more than
ilto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2005 7:05 PM
> To: election-methods@electorama.com
> Subject: [EM] Paul: Your ramblings about sincerity
>
>
> Paul Kislanko says:
>
> If your definition is not universally applicable,
e-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2005 7:05 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [EM] Paul: Your ramblings about sincerity
>
>
> Paul Kislanko says:
>
> If your definition is not uni
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