It means that a non-extreme range votes ballot can be optimal, but if it is
the case,
at least two extreme range votes ballot should be optimal too.
So if the linear optimum theorem applies and you have found some case where
a non-extreme rating contributes to an optimal ballot strategy, thus you
For more voters, it is not simple. For an optimal strategy, one that
would optimize the result form the voter point of view,
the question depends of the probability of the rest of the ballots.
Saying it's a no-information election is not sufficient.
Are non-extreme position like B2 A1 C1 or B1 A0 C
Hi bunch,
from what I concluded:
1) Winning votes is resistant to truncature when it comes to protect a
strong Condorcet winner:
it means a group of electors cannot get their favorite candidate elected
instead of the Condorcet winner
if this Condorcet winner has a 50%+1 majority against each othe
I agree with Scott,
The image we get of the debates is a 1-dimensional projection
of a multi-dimensional opinions set.
One first consequence is that any set of preference can be totally sincere.
On the contrary of what Mike said in some examples,
there is no need to consider electors as betrayors
:
> At 11:34 PM 2/15/2007, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
> >Sorry to target an honest idea,
> >but my main critic about random methods is the fact that
> >results are not reproductible. Thus, the incentive for fraud
> >is huge and the electors confidence within the syst
Do we really need boundaries to obtain any representation?
Would any other way to capture comparable population samples be preferable?
Actually the geographical link ties up electors that belong
to the same region, thus obtaining different electorate in each region...
Having all districts with the
Sorry to target an honest idea,
but my main critic about random methods is the fact that
results are not reproductible. Thus, the incentive for fraud
is huge and the electors confidence within the system should drop
with time...
This remark does not remove any of the qualities suggested by Forest
I definitively disagree with Abd, the Burr dilemna or any measure of the
number of starategy
a voter has to consider should be the main criteria to evaluate electoral
systems.
If the goal of an electoral system - and I believe it should be it -
is to elect people based on sincere preferences of th
Sorry but no, I am definitively not playing with words.
I am just making sure that the terminology used, leaves
some way to describe SPPA. Call it the way you want,
but make sure people understand that a single-runner method
can have multiple-winners if the voters of each districts are considered
e
I understand.
James Gilmour a écrit :
> > Stephane Rouillon> Sent: 16 October 2006 21:18
> >
> > Sorry for asking a question most people already know, but
> > Is there any difference between STV and STV-PR systems or are
> > they simply two names for t
ier on the list?
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/
> 2006-July/018392.html
> I think it is proportional and single winner (but does not always
> elect the plurality winner of each district).
>
> Juho Laatu
>
> On Oct 16, 2006, at 23:30
Same story...
Multiple-winners districts are needed, not necessarily multiple-membered
districts.
Stephane
James Gilmour a écrit :
> (...)
>
> To ensure effective representation in legislatures, councils, etc, all
> districts should be multi-member (whatever PR voting system
> you use). (...)
It is possible to achieve PR with single-member districts if by single-member
district it means
only one representative of any political can be candidate. This unclassical
definition does not say that there will be only one winner.
There could be several or even none.
However, if by single-membe
Hello EM List,
I have been rather busy with electoral reform in Quebec, but I finally
found the time
to answer some mails I kept since summer.
I made an identical analysis to Mr. Olson's point of view, that leaded
me to a bicameral scheme too:
one geographic representation for demanders and one
Sorry for asking a question most people already know, but
Is there any difference between STV and STV-PR systems or are they
simply two names for the same model? If not what is the difference?
Stephane.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ns than a true expression of ones preferences.
Anthony Duff a écrit :
> --- Stephane Rouillon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > any system that would leave a default value for unvalued/unranked/unapproved
> > candidates would help. Personnaly, I would suggest:
> &
Hi Dave,
any system that would leave a default value for unvalued/unranked/unapproved
candidates would help. Personnaly, I would suggest:
A) Let the voter precise the score, rank or state of all unexpressed
preferences;
B) I favor preference-style ballots over simple approbational ballots;
C) I fa
I am against compulsory voting and compulsory full ranking.
Not going to vote is the only way left to voters that want to say
all candidates are bad, except when a None option is provided
(which should always be the case so we could know the
level of approbation from the electorate in regard to th
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