Hi,
This post is just about criteria generally.
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
At 10:52 AM 2/19/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Election criteria sometimes presume omniscience. For example, the
Majority Criterion is based
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
At 06:15 PM 2/16/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hm? Maximum utility meaning matches the SU winner perfectly or
matches the SU winner the best among methods that actually exist?
In the former case it's not clear this method actually exists.
On Mon, 19 Feb 2007 16:52:08 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
At 06:15 PM 2/16/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
...
Nope. But you see that your criticism of Condorcet also applies to EUC.
If voters don't vote strategically, then it can
At 10:52 AM 2/19/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Election criteria sometimes presume omniscience. For example, the
Majority Criterion is based upon voter preferences that may not be
expressed, or even expressable, in the votes. Prefer, as it was
At 06:15 PM 2/16/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hm? Maximum utility meaning matches the SU winner perfectly or
matches the SU winner the best among methods that actually exist?
In the former case it's not clear this method actually exists. In the
latter case I'd guess that you shouldn't guarantee
On Feb 15, 2007, at 23:29 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Thus, we conclude, the Condorcet Criterion *must* be violated in some
elections by an optimal method, and thus this theoretical optimum
method must fail the criterion and others similar to it,
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
then Range still fails
SFC, and it is easy to construct scenarios where it does so by
choosing a winner who is clearly better for society and for the
members of society individually, than the Condorcet winner.
This is because of
At 04:29 PM 2/15/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I would guess that most of our criteria *do* coincide with higher
utility. All things being equal you couldn't expect that a method that
fails majority favorite would produce higher utility.
I'm not sure what all things being equal means, particularly
