> Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2007 20:37:21 +0200 (CEST)
> From: Kevin Venzke
> Subject: [EM] RE : Re: Election methods in student government...
> > IRV satisfies LNH but strictly speaking does not allow equal rankings.
> > MMPO satisfies LNH but allows equal rankings. Would there b
Gervase,
--- Gervase Lam <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2006 18:36:06 +0100 (CET)
> > From: Kevin Venzke
> > Subject: Re: [EM] Election methods in student government...
Interesting that you pull that message up.
> IRV satisfies LNH but strictly speaking does not allow equal
Chris Benham wrote:
> 38: A
> 19: B>C>D
> 17: B>D>C
> 10: C>B
> 03: C>D
> 10: D>C
> 03: D>B
My example here of DSC failing both DMT and Condorcet Loser works, but
not quite what I meant to type:
38: A
19: B>C>D
17: B>D>C
10: C>D
03: C>B
10: D>C
03: D>B
(I've "corrected" it below as well).
Tim Hull wrote:
> DSC uses a somewhat interesting method - it effectively goes and
> excludes the groups of candidates that the most people prefer a "solid
> coalition" to until it finds a winner. However, what I am wondering
> is - what are the primary flaws of these two methods (especially
DSC uses a somewhat interesting method - it effectively goes and excludes
the groups of candidates that the most people prefer a "solid coalition" to
until it finds a winner. However, what I am wondering is - what are the
primary flaws of these two methods (especially as compared with IRV, of
whi
Tim,
--- Tim Hull <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> At this point, I'd say the choice is between IRV/STV and some form of
> range/approval voting (for single and multi-winner elections). The issue
> of
> later-no-harm may come into play, though, and cause IRV/STV to be the
> choice... As it is, st
Too late at night to remember exactly what LNH means but, assuming it
REALLY calls IRV better than Condorcet, I have to offer a compensating
example.
Given:
37 A
31 B33B>32C while 65C>37A).
2 C - C still wins.
What it all means: Condorcet looks at all that the voters say, while IRV
OK, wasn't sure about Condorcet - I knew that to meet the Condorcet
criterion with a voting method you had to violate later-no-harm, but not
that the finding of a Condorcet winner in and of itself violated LNH.
Thanks for clearing that up...
Regarding the single winner methods, it seems that IRV
Hi,
--- Tim Hull <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Also, what preferential methods exist that satisfy "later no harm"? I
> think
> that students, more than others, tend to "bullet vote" - and this may be
> a
> consideration. I know range, Borda, et al don't satisfy it, and IRV/STV
> do
> (they fai
