This method is based on rankings with truncations and approval cutoffs.
Let X be the candidate approved on the greatest number of ballots. Let Y be
the candidate ranked on the greatest number of ballots.
If X and Y are the same candidate, then this candidate wins.
Otherwise, a ballot is
Dear Folks!
I like Forest's idea. Most probably, one has to alter it slightly in order to
get monotonicity. For example like this:
Let the approval sequence of a set S of candidates be the sequence of
approval values of the elements of S in increasing order and continued to
infinity by
Paul Kislanko asked ...
Why introduce majority dense and not use that?
Forest answers:
1. Because it wasn't necessary for the purpose of my message, which was to
nudge readers out of their mental ruts.
2. Is the introducer the only one who can use an idea?
Paul went on to ask ...
Title: Re: A class of ballot set with unbeaten in mean lotteries.
The following lottery method is easier to explain in
terms of ratings (range ballots), but can (and should) be adapted to rankings
(ordinal ballots) by modifying the following definition.
Definition 1: Lottery L1beats
