of the
counting method (I think it has been written here that someone has proven
that).
Thanks for the wishes, and the same to
all!
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of rob
brownSent: Saturday, December 24, 2005 4:11 PMTo: Paul
KislankoCc: election-meth
On 12/24/05, Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Rob Brown wrote: I'm a
little curious, since you seem to talk about multiple voters switching their
vote togethermaybe this really represents a situation where there are
multiple equilibriums, as opposed to no
equilibriums?"
On th
December 24, 2005 2:50 PMTo: Jan
KokCc: election-methods@electorama.comSubject: Re: [EM]
Approval Voting elections don't always have an
equilibrium
On 12/23/05, Jan Kok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
In
Rob Brown's "Movie Night" introduction to election methods, R
On 12/23/05, Jan Kok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
In Rob Brown's "Movie Night" introduction to election methods, Robsuggests that allowing people to watch the current vote results andchange their votes as often as they like would lead to a stablesituation where no one would feel a need to change thei
Jan wrote:
> So, it seems an Approval election can have NO equilibrium, and
> obviously there will often be ONE equilibrium. Question: can
> there be more than one equilibrium?
Yes, but I believe it requires sincere tied preferences. Given
the sincere rankings
49:A>B=C
21:B>C>A
30:C>B>A
there
In Rob Brown's "Movie Night" introduction to election methods, Rob
suggests that allowing people to watch the current vote results and
change their votes as often as they like would lead to a stable
situation where no one would feel a need to change their vote. (I
believe that situation is called
