At 11:46 PM 2/1/2007, Brian Olson wrote:
>Here's a data point on scanners:
>http://catalog2.panasonic.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/ModelDetail?displayTab=O&storeId=11201&catalogId=13051&itemId=93888&catGroupId=13856&surfModel=KV-S3105C
>100 page scans per minute with 1000 page feeder, $1300. Defin
At 11:46 PM 2/1/2007, Brian Olson wrote:
>Rivest pointed out in his discussion of 3-ballot that posting actual
>images of ballots is bad because it allows for covert channels of
>information which destroy secrecy.
Then secrecy is already destroyed, except that it is only violated
with regard to
On Thu, 01 Feb 2007 08:10:49 -0500 Michael Poole wrote:
> Dave Ketchum writes:
>
>
Are there ways to improve DREs so that they can be made secure and
fully auditable? NIST and the STS do not know how to write testable
requirements to satisfy that the software in a DRE is correct.
Here's a data point on scanners:
http://catalog2.panasonic.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/ModelDetail?displayTab=O&storeId=11201&catalogId=13051&itemId=93888&catGroupId=13856&surfModel=KV-S3105C
100 page scans per minute with 1000 page feeder, $1300. Definitely not
bad.
Then it's just a simple mat
At 09:39 PM 2/1/2007, Brian Olson wrote:
>My current favorite solution for practical elections is hand counted paper
>ballots with computer data entry (on common desktop PCs, not special
>machines). It would take a person 30-60 seconds to enter a ballot into the
>computer.
I've made the following
Ok, I was being too short and pedantic. I would actually be just fine with
a software solution that was "good enough for banks" rather than "good
enough for airplanes". I believe a lot of financial software runs on Java
with little more than Sun's assurance that the Java compiler and JVM are
le
On Thu, 1 Feb 2007, Brian Olson wrote:
> But the problem is you didn't count the million lines of python
> interpreter or the millions of lines of X11 or Linux you might run it on.
>
> If you're going to claim verification, you need verified building blocks
> or build the whole thing yourself.
Any
But the problem is you didn't count the million lines of python
interpreter or the millions of lines of X11 or Linux you might run it on.
If you're going to claim verification, you need verified building blocks
or build the whole thing yourself.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
On Thu, 1 Feb 200
On Thu, 1 Feb 2007, Michael Poole wrote:
> Some companies have done rigorous proofs of software correctness for
> applications like money-holding smart cards (including proofs for the
> related protocols). This is a more-constrained problem than
> electronic voting -- primarily in the complexity o
On Thu, 1 Feb 2007, Michael Poole wrote:
> Dave Ketchum writes:
>
Are there ways to improve DREs so that they can be made secure and
fully auditable? NIST and the STS do not know how to write testable
requirements to satisfy that the software in a DRE is correct.
>>
>>
>> If they ai
Dave Ketchum writes:
>>>Are there ways to improve DREs so that they can be made secure and
>>>fully auditable? NIST and the STS do not know how to write testable
>>>requirements to satisfy that the software in a DRE is correct.
>
>
> If they ain't that smart, nor even smart enough to hire needed
On Wed, 31 Jan 2007 21:35:31 -0800 Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> At 12:28 AM -0500 2/1/07, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>Step back, and think of the many places where we use computers BECAUSE, if
>>designed and built to provide a service, they are the best way to get it
>>done successfully:
>>
>
> NIST is
At 12:28 AM -0500 2/1/07, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>Step back, and think of the many places where we use computers BECAUSE, if
>designed and built to provide a service, they are the best way to get it
>done successfully:
NIST is charged under HAVA (Help America Vote Act) with providing
technical advice
Black box voting has done much good, encouraging us to look closer at
election evils.
HOWEVER, this time their advice flunks. They correctly point out that
there are too many failures of voting equipment, but do not note:
There are many failures for which DREs get blamed.
BUT few, i
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