On Mar 10, 2007, at 21:31 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Forest,
you wrote:
At the other extreme, suppose the election is presidential, and one
voter bullets for write-in X, and no other voter even approves X, and
that the first ballot drawn is the bullet for X. Then under D2MAC
candidate X wins
Dear Forest,
you wrote:
> At the other extreme, suppose the election is presidential, and one
> voter bullets for write-in X, and no other voter even approves X, and
> that the first ballot drawn is the bullet for X. Then under D2MAC
> candidate X wins.
The reason I suggested D2MAC was foremost
Suppose that the alternatives are three restaurants for lunch, and the
preferences of the two friends are:
1 Italian>Mexican>>Thai
1 Thai>Mexican>>Italian
[The second voter seems to prefer hotter spices.]
Under D2MAC they would always end up at a Mexican restaurant for lunch.
This is fine if t
On Mar 9, 2007, at 7:00 , Scott Ritchie wrote:
On Thu, 2007-03-08 at 10:56 -0500, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Under what conditions could random ballot be the
ideal method? What goal of an election would be best served by random
ballot, and not by another method designed specifically for that
On Mar 9, 2007, at 0:43 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Warren,
you wrote:
Aha, that explains it. The phrasing of the definition was
very poor since it can be parsed in several ways.
You have to try to define things in ways that can only be parsed
in one
way. It helps to use short sentences.
On Thu, 2007-03-08 at 10:56 -0500, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 04:55 AM 3/8/2007, Scott Ritchie wrote:
> >But let us not forget that even random candidate can get better results
> >than any method some of the time.
> It would be important to determine conditions where Mr. Richie's
> statement
Dear Warren,
you wrote:
> Aha, that explains it. The phrasing of the definition was
> very poor since it can be parsed in several ways.
> You have to try to define things in ways that can only be parsed in one
> way. It helps to use short sentences. With long sentences you
> start wondering whi
Dear Warren,
you wrote:
> --WDS:
> ok, let us review.
> The two drawn ballots are both "favourite A, also approved C" and btoh A and
> C are
> approved. I do not understand why C wins with certainty here.
> Refer to the defn of the method at top. If not the favourite "more approved"
> than m
>Lomax:
> > > Recall that in D2MAC you specify a favourite and as many "also
> > approved"
> > > options as you want. Then two ballots are drawn and the winner is the
> > > most approved option amoung those that are approved on both ballots
> > > (if such an option exists), or else the favourite o
> Recall that in D2MAC you specify a favourite and as many "also approved"
> options as you want. Then two ballots are drawn and the winner is the
> most approved option amoung those that are approved on both ballots
> (if such an option exists), or else the favourite option of the first
> ballot.
At 04:55 AM 3/8/2007, Scott Ritchie wrote:
>But let us not forget that even random candidate can get better results
>than any method some of the time.
This would depend on the goal of the election. As noted previously,
if, for example, the goal of the election, or more specifically of a
series o
Hello folks,
here's a little mathematics to show that:
Under D2MAC, in a situation with individual utilities
a*n voters: A 1, C alpha, B 0
b*n voters: B 1, C beta, A 0,
where 0 < b < a < 1 and 1/2 < alpha,beta < 1,
the voting strategy
a*n voters: A favourite, C also approved
b*n vo
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes:
> At 04:58 PM 3/7/2007, Michael Poole wrote:
>>Randomness is not identical to noise. Stochastic computing methods
>>use randomness to get "good" results (according to the method's
>>definition of good) -- in many cases, much faster than naive methods
>>reach comparable
Dear Scott, you wrote:
> This isn't how I read the description of the method. It seemed quite
> implied that candidates marked "favorite" are NOT also "approved".
Ah, now I understand the problem. I thought it was obvious that the
favourite option is approved. Therefore the others were called "a
On Thu, 2007-03-08 at 09:50 +0100, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Dear Scott,
>
> you wrote:
> > That seems really lame. Such a method would certainly fail to elect A
> > even if there was unanimous consent!
> What do you mean by that? Unanimous consent about A like in
>
> 100%-x: A 100, C 90, B 0
> x:
Dear Scott,
you wrote:
> That seems really lame. Such a method would certainly fail to elect A
> even if there was unanimous consent!
What do you mean by that? Unanimous consent about A like in
100%-x: A 100, C 90, B 0
x: B 100, C 90, A 0
with very small x?
In that case, only somewhat mor
At 04:58 PM 3/7/2007, Michael Poole wrote:
>Randomness is not identical to noise. Stochastic computing methods
>use randomness to get "good" results (according to the method's
>definition of good) -- in many cases, much faster than naive methods
>reach comparable results.
Gad, this is irritating.
> > > Are you claiming C wins with certainty???
> > Yes, of course. Doesn't that follow from the definition of the method?
> > The set of options approved on both ballots is {A,C} of which C is the
> > most approved member.
>
>That seems really lame. Such a method would certainly fail to elect A
On Thu, 2007-03-08 at 00:20 +0100, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Dear Warren,
>
> you wondered:
> > --WDS: Huh?
> > So suppose both ballots are "favorite A, also approved C."
> >
> > Are you claiming C wins with certainty???
> Yes, of course. Doesn't that follow from the definition of the method?
> The
Dear Warren,
you wondered:
> --WDS: Huh?
> So suppose both ballots are "favorite A, also approved C."
>
> Are you claiming C wins with certainty???
Yes, of course. Doesn't that follow from the definition of the method?
The set of options approved on both ballots is {A,C} of which C is the
most a
> Recall that in D2MAC you specify a favourite and as many "also approved"
> options as you want. Then two ballots are drawn and the winner is the
> most approved option amoung those that are approved on both ballots
> (if such an option exists), or else the favourite option of the first
> ballot.
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes:
> At 10:45 AM 3/7/2007, Michael Poole wrote:
>> > And "noise" is precisely the correct term. If we have an electronic
>> > decision-making system that depends on logic and/or pattern
>> > recognition to make choices, and we introduce into that system
>> > electronic noi
Dear Warren,
I wrote:
> Recall that in D2MAC you specify a favourite and as many "also approved"
> options as you want. Then two ballots are drawn and the winner is the
> most approved option amoung those that are approved on both ballots
> (if such an option exists), or else the favourite option
>Jobst Heitzig:
A typical voting situation is
55%: A>C>B
45%: B>C>A
with C being considered a good compromise by all voters
(in the sense that all voters would definitely prefer C strongly
to tossing a coin between A and B).
--WDS: to be concrete, let us consider utility(A)=10, utility(C)=9, u
At 10:45 AM 3/7/2007, Michael Poole wrote:
> > And "noise" is precisely the correct term. If we have an electronic
> > decision-making system that depends on logic and/or pattern
> > recognition to make choices, and we introduce into that system
> > electronic noise that causes the built-in choice
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes:
> At 05:06 AM 3/7/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>>it is frequently claimed that methods which involve randomness may be
>>fairer than other methods but will give "worse" results.
>
> Given that it couold appear that I have made that claim, let me be
> explicit that I have
At 05:06 AM 3/7/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>it is frequently claimed that methods which involve randomness may be
>fairer than other methods but will give "worse" results.
Given that it couold appear that I have made that claim, let me be
explicit that I have not. I have claimed something which c
Hello folks,
it is frequently claimed that methods which involve randomness may be
fairer than other methods but will give "worse" results.
Here's evidence for just the contrary:
A typical voting situation is
55%: A>C>B
45%: B>C>A
with C being considered a good compromise by all voters
(in t
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