> > > Are you claiming C wins with certainty??? > > Yes, of course. Doesn't that follow from the definition of the method? > > The set of options approved on both ballots is {A,C} of which C is the > > most approved member. > >That seems really lame. Such a method would certainly fail to elect A >even if there was unanimous consent!
With those two ballots being the ones randomly chosen, C wins because A and C are ok with both voters, and, of those 2 candidates, more people approve C. That doesn't sound unfair. Maybe it seems as if A should be the winner, given that drawing result, but there's where this method differs from Random Ballot. It compromises for a more Approved winner. If A had even a little more total approval than C, then A would win. It sounds great, by my goals too, but of course it seems very unlikely that the public would accept a random method. Mike Ossipoff ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info