Looking at the case where two voters see two candidates as about equally
desirable:
If one votes A>B, and the other B>A, we count '1' in each of the two
preferences.
But, in Condorcet, both could vote A=B:
I have proposed giving the same count as above for,
essentially, th
On Dec 18, 2006, at 8:31 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
> How did we get here?
>
> You talk of a method in which ONE voter can say BOTH A>B AND B>A.
>
Yes, either in the sense that both lose to each others or in the
sense that both win each others.
> Assuming such a method could claim useful value to ju
How did we get here?
You talk of a method in which ONE voter can say BOTH A>B AND B>A.
Assuming such a method could claim useful value to justify the headaches
of implementing it and making it understood, I have seen nothing to
suggest Condorcet might have such an ability.
In Condorcet the
I thought mostly use scenarios where the favourite candidate is not
involved in the cycles and the voters know very little about the
anticipated results. Another example in this direction would be
situation where there are n parties that each have 3 candidates.
Voters would then vote so tha
How did we get here?
I assume no ties to simplify the discussion - not to change the rules.
If there is a cycle, such as X>A>Y>X, A backers have no control as to X>A,
but they can influence whether there is also a Y>X to create a cycle.
Else, assuming more voters back X than A, A loses and it m
Here is one very basic case where a group of voters has identical
preferences but they benefit of casting three different kind of ballots.
In a Condorcet method there is an interest to create a loop to your
opponents. In its simplest form there are four candidates. One of the
candidates is o
Scott Ritchie wrote:
On Wed, 2006-12-13 at 21:06 +1030, Chris Benham wrote:
Scott Ritchie wrote:
I was thinking about corporate elections today, and how under some
voting systems an individual would want to strategically vote by
submitting multiple, different ballots. I soon realiz
On Wed, 2006-12-13 at 21:06 +1030, Chris Benham wrote:
>
> Scott Ritchie wrote:
>
> >I was thinking about corporate elections today, and how under some
> >voting systems an individual would want to strategically vote by
> >submitting multiple, different ballots. I soon realized that this was
> >
Scott Ritchie wrote:
>I was thinking about corporate elections today, and how under some
>voting systems an individual would want to strategically vote by
>submitting multiple, different ballots. I soon realized that this was
>generalizable to multiple voters with identical preferences in any
>
I was thinking about corporate elections today, and how under some
voting systems an individual would want to strategically vote by
submitting multiple, different ballots. I soon realized that this was
generalizable to multiple voters with identical preferences in any
election.
Basically, somethi
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