Hi,
This post is just about criteria generally.
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> At 10:52 AM 2/19/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > > Election criteria sometimes presume omniscience. For example, the
> > > Majority Criter
At 10:52 AM 2/19/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > Election criteria sometimes presume omniscience. For example, the
> > Majority Criterion is based upon voter preferences that may not be
> > expressed, or even expressable, in the votes. "Prefer,"
On Mon, 19 Feb 2007 16:52:08 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi,
>
> --- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>
>>At 06:15 PM 2/16/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
...
> Nope. But you see that your criticism of Condorcet also applies to EUC.
>
>
>>If voters don't vote strategically, t
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> At 06:15 PM 2/16/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >Hm? "Maximum utility" meaning "matches the SU winner perfectly" or
> >"matches the SU winner the best among methods that actually exist"?
> >
> >In the former case it's not clear this method a
At 06:15 PM 2/16/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>Hm? "Maximum utility" meaning "matches the SU winner perfectly" or
>"matches the SU winner the best among methods that actually exist"?
>
>In the former case it's not clear this method actually exists. In the
>latter case I'd guess that you shouldn't guar
On Feb 15, 2007, at 23:29 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
> --- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>> Thus, we conclude, the Condorcet Criterion *must* be violated in some
>> elections by an optimal method, and thus this theoretical optimum
>> method must fail the criterion and others simila
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> At 11:21 AM 2/16/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >What I mean is, if you create two arbitrary methods, one satisfying
> >MF and one not, you should expect the first one to have higher utility.
>
> This is weird, actually. It could be the cas
At 04:29 PM 2/15/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>I would guess that most of our criteria *do* coincide with higher
>utility. All things being equal you couldn't expect that a method that
>fails majority favorite would produce higher utility.
I'm not sure what "all things being equal" means, particularl
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> then Range still fails
> SFC, and it is easy to construct scenarios where it does so by
> choosing a winner who is clearly "better" for society and for the
> members of society individually, than the Condorcet winner.
>
> This is beca
