At 11:19 PM 3/13/2007, Michael Poole wrote:
>Take a voter who thinks candidate A is the best, B is bad, and C is
>the worst. His best estimates of normalized utility might be A=1,
>B=0.2, C=0.
Why does he not vote his best estimate?
>If the ballot asks for scores based on how much a voter likes
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes:
> At 05:56 PM 3/13/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>> > The problem is that we have this idea of
>> > exaggeration. But why would one exaggerate?
>> > *Because they care.* In other words, it is not an exaggeration.
>>
>>You can similarly say that if I rob a bank at gunpoint,
At 05:56 PM 3/13/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> > The problem is that we have this idea of
> > exaggeration. But why would one exaggerate?
> > *Because they care.* In other words, it is not an exaggeration.
>
>You can similarly say that if I rob a bank at gunpoint, I must have
>genuinely needed the mo
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > > Seemed simple, I was "exaggerating."
> > >
> > > But wait! If I vote this way, it must be that I prefer A to B with
> > > more strength than I prefer B to C. So the conditions of the problem
> > > are contradictory.
>
> What I'm sayi
At 03:03 AM 3/13/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>Hi,
>
>--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > I used to think that I understood what "strategic" voting in Range
> > was, i.e., say I prefer A>B>C. And, say, I would rate them 1, 0.5,
> > and 0 respectively. Ah, but I really want A to w
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> I used to think that I understood what "strategic" voting in Range
> was, i.e., say I prefer A>B>C. And, say, I would rate them 1, 0.5,
> and 0 respectively. Ah, but I really want A to win. So I rate B, not
> at 0.5, but at 0.
I guess
