Forest,
--- "Simmons, Forest" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> However, there may be voters that wish to maximize the probability that
> their ballot will be positively pivotal, i.e. they might wish to maximize
> their voting power. For these voters the "above median" approval
> strategy is better
Kevin,
I misread what you wrote, but now I see that you were indeed measuring which
method maximized expected range value for the voter.
However, there may be voters that wish to maximize the probability that their
ballot will be positively pivotal, i.e. they might wish to maximize their
vo
In the zero information case (with many voters), "above mean utility approval
strategy" (Strategy E in Kevin's simulation) is optimal for maximinzing an
individual voters expected utility.
However, that's not what Kevin is using as a measure of success. If I
understand him correctly, a vote
At 06:14 AM 11/1/2006, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>A normal election is usually not close enough to a tie for what ONE voter
>does to make a difference. If, generally, the collection of voters that
>consider A and B tolerable vote your strategy, A and B can tie; if each
>who has a clear preference votes
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> C
> 31% of +2 -> log(7)=0.84
> 69% of +1 -> log(6)=0.78
>
> Expected: 0.80
>
> D
> 45% of -1 -> log(4)=0.60
> 55% of +4 -> log(9)=0.95
>
> Expect: 0.79
>
The numbers labeled Expected: and Expect: are the expected utility of
the random event. It is
> A. Sincere. This voter rates the candidates sincerely even if this means
> he doesn't use the top or bottom ratings.
> B. Maximized sincere. This is the same as A, except that the best and
> worst candidates are moved to the 10 and 0 positions, in order to
> maximize the weight between these
On Tue, 31 Oct 2006 16:22:56 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hello,
>
> -- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>
>>Quoting from below:
>> >
>> > These results suggest to me that in the zero-info case, if there are
>> > thought to be more than about 2 other voters, Range should be voted
>
At 04:42 PM 10/30/2006, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>I wrote a simulation to measure the utility of zero-info Approval
>strategy in zero-info Range elections.
Range Voting is designed to maximize overall utility to society, not
*expected utility* for the individual voter. This study seems to
replicate t
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Kevin, I did not understand how many voters there were in
> your simulations.
> Other than that, they look interesting and confirm my own
> (and others') widely held suspicions.
I think the way it works is that he picks a number between
0 and S for each candidate.
Hello,
-- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Quoting from below:
> >
> > These results suggest to me that in the zero-info case, if there are
> > thought to be more than about 2 other voters, Range should be voted
> > as in Approval.
> >
> > D. Zero-info Approval strategy. The vote
Kevin, I did not understand how many voters there were in
your simulations.
Other than that, they look interesting and confirm my own
(and others') widely held suspicions.
wds
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Quoting from below:
>
> These results suggest to me that in the zero-info case, if there are
> thought to be more than about 2 other voters, Range should be voted
> as in Approval.
>
> D. Zero-info Approval strategy. The voter gives a 10 to every candidate
> at least as good as the average v
Hello,
I wrote a simulation to measure the utility of zero-info Approval
strategy in zero-info Range elections.
In each of 100,000 elections one specific voter has sincere ratings
from 0-10 for each of five candidates. Four methods of voting are
implemented:
A. Sincere. This voter rates the can
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