Kevin,
I misread what you wrote, but now I see that you were indeed measuring which
method maximized expected range value for the voter.
However, there may be voters that wish to maximize the probability that their
ballot will be positively pivotal, i.e. they might wish to maximize their
In the zero information case (with many voters), above mean utility approval
strategy (Strategy E in Kevin's simulation) is optimal for maximinzing an
individual voters expected utility.
However, that's not what Kevin is using as a measure of success. If I
understand him correctly, a vote
On Tue, 31 Oct 2006 16:22:56 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
-- Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Quoting from below:
These results suggest to me that in the zero-info case, if there are
thought to be more than about 2 other voters, Range should be voted
as in Approval.
A. Sincere. This voter rates the candidates sincerely even if this means
he doesn't use the top or bottom ratings.
B. Maximized sincere. This is the same as A, except that the best and
worst candidates are moved to the 10 and 0 positions, in order to
maximize the weight between these two
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
C
31% of +2 - log(7)=0.84
69% of +1 - log(6)=0.78
Expected: 0.80
D
45% of -1 - log(4)=0.60
55% of +4 - log(9)=0.95
Expect: 0.79
The numbers labeled Expected: and Expect: are the expected utility of
the random event. It is often useful
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Kevin, I did not understand how many voters there were in
your simulations.
Other than that, they look interesting and confirm my own
(and others') widely held suspicions.
I think the way it works is that he picks a number between
0 and S for each candidate. The
At 04:42 PM 10/30/2006, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I wrote a simulation to measure the utility of zero-info Approval
strategy in zero-info Range elections.
Range Voting is designed to maximize overall utility to society, not
*expected utility* for the individual voter. This study seems to
replicate
Kevin, I did not understand how many voters there were in
your simulations.
Other than that, they look interesting and confirm my own
(and others') widely held suspicions.
wds
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