--- Jan Kok [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 3/21/06, Anthony Duff [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I, like James, have thought about this. It is particularly relevant in the
common
Australian electorate, where the voting pattern is (with A left, B squeezed
centre, C right, extreme and other random
On Mar 12, 2006, at 8:28 AM, radio deli wrote: Dear Jan, I saw your post on the Elections Methods List. As a Vermont legislator, we may have to decide the issue of IRV on a statewide basis. To be honest, I'm not very enthusiastic about IRV. I would prefer to support the candidate (not plural)
Oops!
And a good thing for double checks!
The good thing about having implemented all these things 4-5 times is
that I had another set of code to check myself against, and that
agreed with Mr. LeGrand's calculations. I found the bug in my new
code which erroneously reported that IRV and
radio deli wrote:
What are the problems you see with IRV? Could you explain them in a
way
that people without a statistics degree (like me) could comprehend? I
hope you have a chance to respond---you seem quite knowledgeable on the
topic!
Here's a great commentary posted by Ralph Suter
SUMMARY of what I see since Rep. Jim Condon asked for help:
With IRV, tie-rank votes need to either be prohibited or the exact way of
accounting for them defined (counting them with each tied candidate
holding the same rank encourages taking advantage of such voting). With
Condorcet, tie-rank
At 12:47 PM -0500 3/14/06, Dave Ketchum wrote:
SUMMARY of what I see since Rep. Jim Condon asked for help:
With IRV, tie-rank votes need to either be prohibited or the exact way of
accounting for them defined (counting them with each tied candidate
holding the same rank encourages taking
Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Jeff O'Neill (who I think is on this list) suggests a tree
representation of an ranked election profile (Voting matters #21
http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE21/INDEX.HTM) as a means of
speeding up the tabulation of the election. It seems to me that
Jan Kok Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 4:07 AM
Yes, I agree that the election rules affect how people vote.
But, unsophisticated IRV supporters are not aware that there
can be incentives to vote insincerely in IRV elections, or
may believe that IRV and Condorcet will always, or almost
James Gilmour wrote:
Jan Kok Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 4:07 AM
Yes, I agree that the election rules affect how people vote.
But, unsophisticated IRV supporters are not aware that there
can be incentives to vote insincerely in IRV elections, or
may believe that IRV and Condorcet will
Eric Gorr Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 1:31 PM
James Gilmour wrote:
Jan Kok Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 4:07 AM
Yes, I agree that the election rules affect how people vote.
But, unsophisticated IRV supporters are not aware that there
can be incentives to vote insincerely in IRV
Quoting James Gilmour [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Eric Gorr Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 1:31 PM
James Gilmour wrote:
Jan Kok Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 4:07 AM
Yes, I agree that the election rules affect how people vote.
But, unsophisticated IRV supporters are not aware that there
can be
At 9:06 PM -0700 3/12/06, Jan Kok wrote:
When I counted Kiss vs. Miller 4755 to 3988, I didn't
count any of the Kiss=Miller votes. I just now checked one of my
intermediate data files and saw that there were 13 ballots that ranked
Kiss=Miller(=others sometimes). If you want to give each 1/2
Dear Jan,
I saw your post on the Elections Methods
List. As a Vermont legislator, we may have to decide the issue of IRV on a
statewide basis.To be honest, I'm not very enthusiastic about
IRV. I would prefer to support the candidate (not plural) of my choice,
and if a runoff must occur
At 11:25 PM -0800 3/10/06, Rob LeGrand wrote:
I took the raw data from the site Brian Olson posted and ended up with a
slightly different pairwise table:
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0)- 5545 6747 3991 6790 7336
(1) 3556- 5165 3397 5136 5875
(2) 1161 1289- 804 2028 3290
(3)
At 11:28 AM -0500 3/12/06, radio deli wrote:
I saw your post on the Elections Methods List. As a Vermont
legislator, we may have to decide the issue of IRV on a statewide
basis. To be honest, I'm not very enthusiastic about IRV. I would
prefer to support the candidate (not plural) of my
BTW - it took more than a day for EM to pass this on to where I could see it.
Delighted to have a Rep. take an interest - too much of the time all that
happens here is debate as to theory.
On Sun, 12 Mar 2006 11:28:48 -0500 radio deli wrote:
Dear Jan,
I saw your post on the Elections
On 3/12/06, Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
At 1:57 AM -0700 3/11/06, Jan Kok wrote:
I crunched the election data and found that Kiss was preferred to
Miller, 4755 to 3988.
Drat. :-)
That's still not numerically consistent with the published Burlington
results; I wonder what the
THANK YOU!!!
Glad you and I agree on the result, though via different approaches.
The Bowman table has the look of being a Condorcet result, though not
actually labeled as such.
So I looked at the numbers for Kiss vs Curley, Louie, and Ploof. In each
case the numbers in row 3 could be Kiss
Holy sacred cow, Batman!!
According to Brian's analysis, Miller was the Condorcet winner, but
Kiss won the actual IRV election. Miller was preferred over Kiss 3991
to 3455.
Brian, the number of first-choice votes according to your histograms
doesn't exactly match the numbers on the Burlington
At 7:00 PM -0700 3/10/06, Jan Kok wrote:
Holy sacred cow, Batman!!
According to Brian's analysis, Miller was the Condorcet winner, but
Kiss won the actual IRV election. Miller was preferred over Kiss 3991
to 3455.
Brian, the number of first-choice votes according to your histograms
doesn't
Thanks for doing this analysis! This is BIG news in the small world
of voting methods! :-)
How so? It's well known that IRV/AV/STV doesn't necessarily find the
Condorcet winner. It shouldn't be too surprising that there are
real-world examples.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
Yes, Jonathan, of
At 11:08 PM -0500 3/10/06, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 09:39 PM 3/10/2006, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
Thanks for doing this analysis! This is BIG news in the small world
of voting methods! :-)
How so? It's well known that IRV/AV/STV doesn't necessarily find the
Condorcet winner. It shouldn't be
Let me generalize my argument.
If an IRV election comes down to two candidates left standing, and
one of those candidates is also the Condorcet winner, then the
Condorcet winner must also be the IRV winner.
That seems to be the case in the Burlington example.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
I took the raw data from the site Brian Olson posted and ended up with a
slightly different pairwise table:
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0)- 5545 6747 3991 6790 7336
(1) 3556- 5165 3397 5136 5875
(2) 1161 1289- 804 2028 3290
(3) 4763 5730 6961- 7027 7351
(4) 987 1318 1869
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