Re: [EM] When Voters Strategize, Approval Voting Elects Condorcet Winners but Condorcet Methods can Elect Condorcet Losers

- Some Condorcet methods (e.g. Minmax(margins)) elect Condorcet Losers with sincere votes. In some extreme situations the Condorcet Loser may be the best candidate. - Note also that the Condorcet specific problems do not do not materialize in most elections. I haven't yet seen any good examp

Re: [EM] When Voters Strategize, Approval Voting Elects Condorcet Winners but Condorcet Methods can Elect Condorcet Losers

It's a little-noticed fact that, in Warren Smith's IEVS simulations, which generate sets of voters with simulated utilities, then apply various voting methods and strategies, (see rangevoting.org), Range Voting, when voters "strategize," is actually beaten by Range with a top-two runoff. Range

Re: [EM] When Voters Strategize, Approval Voting Elects Condorcet Winners but Condorcet Methods can Elect Condorcet Losers

>In contrast, we show that Condorcet methods can elect >a Condorcet Loser with non-zero probability when voters >vote tactically. With strategic agents, approval voting >is better at electing Condorcet Winners than Condorcet methods! If we are fans of Condorcet (and yes, some of us, understandabl

[EM] When Voters Strategize, Approval Voting Elects Condorcet Winners but Condorcet Methods can Elect Condorcet Losers

I've written a short paper that I think you may find interesting. It's still somewhat drafty, but it's good enough to share. Here's the abstract: We show that approval voting strategic equilibria are closely related to honest Condorcet Winners. There exists an approval equilibrium with a clear fo