usness" of
candidates and excluding all candidates who got more than, say, 75% such
dangerousness-marks.
What do you think about this?
Yours, Jobst
> -Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
> Von: "Simmons, Forest"
> Gesendet: 24.06.06 01:22:59
> An:
> Betreff: [EM] Yet Another
Ralph suggested that in the example
45 B>A>>C
40 C>>A>B
15 A>C>B
the smallest faction might prefer a 100% C lottery to a 55%A+45%B, and in that
case approving only C would be better than approving only A.
But if 100%C is better than 55%A+45%B, for the A>B>C faction, then 60%A+40%C
would b
From: Simmons, Forest <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> This method makes use of ordinal information as well as approval
information.
So each voter would rank the candidates and also select one candidate
as
the threshold between approved and unapproved ? All unranked candidates
being unapproved.
>
>1. E
This method makes use of ordinal information as well as approval information.
1. Eliminate each candidate X for which there is a candidate Y such that on
each of more than half of the ballots Y is approved and X is not.
2. Use random ballot among the remaining candidates to choose the winner
