On 12/6/05, James Gilmour [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This is the issue to which there has been no answer from those who suggested it.There is no problem with fixed scale range voting (because the fixed scale 'normalises' the contribution of every voter), but that is not what was proposed to maximise
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 5:28 AM
James Gilmour wrote:
What I had in mind was if I vote 1, 2, 3, 4 (1 = most preferred, the
one I want to see win) for candidates A, B, C, D,
and you vote 100, 99, 2, 1 (1 = most preferred) for the same four
candidates, it would
At 06:00 PM 12/1/2005, rob brown wrote:
I cannot imagine a scenario where it doesn't make the most strategic
sense to give your vote the maximum weight, assuming you vote at all.
Consider this a failure of imagination, not of range voting
On issue voting, one may have a weak opinion, and
At 07:26 PM 12/1/2005, rob brown wrote:
Plurality is bad, but not voting strategically in a plurality system
makes it even worse, in my opinion.
I think Mr. Brown did not understand what was written. Jan had
indicated that he had no preference between the leading candidates.
If this was true
At 08:16 PM 12/1/2005, rob brown wrote:
My wording was a bit sloppy, because it is true that condorcet
SOMETIMES can reward insincere voting. It is not perfect. It is,
in my opinion, really really closeclose enough that insincere
voting will not have a significant effect on elections, and
At 02:01 PM 12/1/2005, James Gilmour wrote:
What I had in mind was if I vote 1, 2, 3, 4 (1 = most preferred, the
one I want to see win) for candidates A, B, C, D,
and you vote 100, 99, 2, 1 (1 = most preferred) for the same four
candidates, it would be fundamentally undemocratic if
your vote
Briefly replying to two people's comments:
Rob Brown wrote:
-snip-
I believe that condorcet elections intentionally ignore strength
of opinion information for the exact same practical reason. Since
there is no way to avoid collecting some strength of opinion
information (while still
On 12/1/05, Steve Eppley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Briefly replying to two people's comments:Rob Brown wrote:-snip- I believe that condorcet elections intentionally ignore strength of opinion information for the exact same practical reason. Since
there is no way to avoid collecting some strength
Steve Eppley wrote:
Hi,
[Rob Brown suggested I post his unintentionally private message
to me and my reply. Here they are.]
Rob wrote to me:
On 12/1/05, Steve Eppley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I agree with both of Rob's messages so far on this topic
except for one sentence,
On 12/1/05, Paul Kislanko [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ah, but you contradict yourself. See
below.
Sorry if you don't want me mentioning borda, but the only way to get
around what you see as wrong is by doing exactly what borda does. And
that is bad.
Borda isn't the only way topreserve rank
I was thinking about Paul K's statement (in several different threads,
hence my top post) that condorcet elections throw important ballot data
away. I'm not trying to pick on Paul, but it got me
thinking. Trying to come up with a way to wrap my head around the
concept, I came up with a simplified
On 11/30/05, rob brown [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 11/30/05, James Gilmour [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
rob brown Sent: Wednesday, November 30, 2005 11:17 PM
From a purely utilitarian point of view (i.e. greatest
happiness), it makes a lot of sense to give more weight to
the opinions of
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